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THE BABY JANE DOE LITIGATION AND
SECTION 504: AN EXERCISE IN RAW
EXECUTIVE POWER
by Michael Vitiello*
Especially over the past several years, federal courts have been
under attack as activist, imperialistic, undemocratic and biased by several constituencies.' This article focuses on the position of the Reagan
administration and its political allies among the right-to-life movement.
As an example of their opposition to federal courts' activism, both unsuccessfully backed the Human Life Bill, 2 which would have denied
lower federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving abortion.3 The attempt to remove abortion cases from lower federal courts was motivated by the perception that these courts had "demonstrated a con-

sistent and unexplainable accommodation of the pro-abortion
position. '
Discussions "seldom address the basic question of what constitutes
Associate Professor of Law, Loyola School of Law, New Orleans. B.A. Swarthmore College;
J.D. University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank Edith Morris for her enthusiastic
research assistance.
1. See. e.g., Glazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary.41 PUB. INT. 104 (1975); Uddo. A Wink
from the Bench: The FederalCourts and Abortion, 53 TUL L. REv. 398 (1979). The same criticism has been implied by Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g.. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.
448 U.S. 555, 604-06 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also R. BERGER, GovERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). But ef. Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon S. 158.
97th Cong., 1st Sess. vol. 1, at 160 (1981) (prepared statement by Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan).
In 1981, there were more than twenty bills pending in Congress to remove jurisdiction from
federal courts in several controversial areas, including school prayer and busing as well as abortion. An Introduction to This Issue, 65 JUDICATURE 177 (1981).
2. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separationof
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 158. supra note 1, at 1117 (1981); H.R. 900,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
3. See, e.g., HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Separationof Powersof the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciaryon S. 158, supra note 1. President Reagan gave his full endorsement to those cflorts
in an article appearing in Human Life Review. Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, 9 Hum. LIFE REv. 7, 12-13 (1983).
4. Uddo, supra note 1, at 460.
*
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judicial activism," which is "often equated with political liberalism,"
while restraint is aligned with conservatism.5 Although much of the recent attack on federal courts suffers a similar lack of defined and principled objections, 6 two themes emerge from a review of the literature
and testimony in support of the Human Life Bill. First, the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade7 is activist because "the right of reproductive privacy was discovered by the Supreme Court itself in 1965,
somehow in the penumbras formed by the emanations from the Bill of
Rights, whatever that means. This is a judicial creation out of the
whole cloth."" That is, one aspect of activism is an "extravagant interpretation" 9 of the law, not grounded in the language or intent of the
law. Second, federal courts have intruded upon an area of the law

rightfully entrusted to the states. Federal courts should defer to the
states because: (1) questions touching on the family are an integral

part of state police and parens patriae powers;10 (2) state statutes are
often involved, and state courts should give definitive interpretation to
state statutes; and (3) federalizing the abortion question has denied the
people and the states the right to form a consensus on the abortion
question.""
Insofar as the Reagan administration's and right-to-life groups' attack on federal courts is based on principles and is not merely political,
5. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 237, 237 (1983).
6. During the course of hearings on the Human Life Bill, Professor Archibald Cox suggested
that the bill was "radical and dangerously unprincipled." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon S. 158, supra note 1, at 328. That
comment produced an angry response from Senator John East. Id. at 423-25.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm, on the
Judiciary on S. 158, supra note I, at 627 (comments of Professor Charles Rice).
9. Id. at 622. ("One of the difficulties here arises from the Supreme Court's extravagant interpretation of the 14th amendment. . . .The Supreme Court has reached out to take jurisdiction
for itself and responsibilities for itself that have proven not to be wise.").
10. "Parens patriae jurisdiction is a right of sovereignty and imposes a duty on the sovereignty
to protect the public interest and . . . such persons with disabilities who have no rightful protector
.... [1]t
extends to the personal liberty of persons who are under a disability whether by reason
of infancy, incompetency, habitual drunkenness, imbecility, etc. . . ." Johnson v. State, 18 N.J.
422, 430, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955); see also Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 736-45, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-30 (1977) (discussing state's right to
decide for an incompetent whether to forgo medical treatment for a terminal illness). More generally, the police power has been defined as "the power inherent in the state to prescribe . . . reasonable regulations necessary to preserve the public order, health, safety or morals," Tighe v.
Osborn, 149 Md. 349, 356, 131 A. 801, 803 (1925).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 325-34.
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recent efforts by those groups in Baby Jane Doe12 and United States v.
3 reflect an abandonment of such principles. In
University Hospital"
Baby Jane Doe, a right-to-life advocate sued to compel the hospital to
treat a seriously ill newborn over the objections of her parents. In University Hospital, the government attempted to secure medical records
of a seriously ill newborn, obviously with a long-range view toward
compelling surgery for the infant. The government's objective was to
override both parental refusal to consent to surgery1 and
acquiescence in
4
professionals.
care
health
by
decision
parental
the
This article examines these cases and the government's effort to
use section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197315 to bring similar
cases into federal court. Essentially, the government's position is that
section 504 prohibits discrimination against seriously ill newborns by
denial of medical treatment, regardless of the infant's potential for a
meaningful life. This article argues that the government's attack violates the very principles advanced in the abortion context. The government was inviting the federal district court to interpret section 504 in
an "extravagant" manner, without the support of the section's language
or legislative history, in a way that would dramatically alter the statefederal balance in favor of federal court jurisdiction.10 In addition to
creating jurisdiction over traditional state law cases, the government's
proposed interpretation of section 504 "discrimination" would replace
the state substantive law, in which the "best interest" standard is the
norm. 17 The government's section 504 strategy is without foundation in
the law and is an open invitation to federal courts to override state law
12. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186,469 N.Y.S.2d 63. affg 95
A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, cert. denied. 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983).
13. 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), a~fd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
14. Before the Second Circuit, the government argued that its suit in the district court was
intended only to determine whether a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1983), was taking place. Brief for the United States at 12, United States
v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). But the Department of Health and Human
Services made clear that it contemplated using the full panoply of remedies available from a
federal court. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July 5,
1983).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1983).
Section 504 provides in relevant part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the bencfits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .. " Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 122-45.
17. See infra notes 205-90 and accompanying text.
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and adopt a uniform national standard.
Apart from Baby Jane Doe and University Hospital,18 Congress

has now legislated, in part, the government's reading of section 504
with the passage of H.R. 1904.19 Therefore, this article considers the
soundness of the government's interpretation of discrimination and concludes that Congress erred in adopting H.R. 1904 which, despite ethical and legal arguments militating against treatment,2 0 requires treatment in some cases without regard for the infant's best interest and

federalizes treatment decisions in an area traditionally left to the
states.
BABY JANE DOE AND THE GOVERNMENT'S SECTION

504 STRATEGY

In a 1983 report, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
reviewed current practices governing decisionmaking for seriously ill
newborns. 21 While it did not endorse in toto current practices, it found
that "[d]espite reports of occasional cases in which seriously erroneous
decisions about the treatment of newborns were carried out, such
22
events appear to be very rare."
One such instance is the now infamous Indiana case of Infant
Doe 23 "in which parents elected to forgo treatment of their newborn
18. Further litigation concerning Baby Jane Doe became moot because the parents consented
to surgery to implant a shunt to relieve pressure on the brain. See Baby Jane Doe Has Surgery to
Remove Waterfrom the Brain, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1984, § 1, at 28, col. 3. The federal govern.
ment apparently has dropped its efforts to obtain Baby Jane Doe's medical records, but plans to
pursue the issue of access in litigation instituted by the American Medical Association and five
other groups. See U.S. Drops 'Baby Jane Doe' Effort, The Hartford Courant, Aug. 18, 1984, at
A2, col. 4.
19. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 1904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor. 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-14 (1983), by a vote of 396 to 4. The bill passed in the Senate by a vote of 89
to 0 as amended by S. 1003, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984). The House of Representatives agreed to
a conference on August 2, 1984. After conference, the House and Senate agreed on final amendments. See H.R. Rep. No. 1038, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Conference
Report]. On October 9, 1984, the legislation was signed by President Reagan, as the Child Abuse
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-457 (Oct. 9, 1984). See Baby Doe at Age 1: A Joy and Burden, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1984, at A56, col. 4.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 147-290.
21.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE3 AND BI-

OMEDICAL AND

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT

197-229 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Commission Report].
22. Id. at 208-09.
23. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12, 1982), writ of
mandamus dismissed sub nom. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S 140 (Ind. Sup. Ct.
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child who had Down's syndrome, tracheoesophageal atresia, and possi' Instead, the
bly additional anomalies."24
parents and treating physicians agreed on a course of nontreatment. Judicial proceedings were
commenced by the hospital, 25 and the trial court upheld the parents'
decision. Nontreatment presumably caused the child's death,20 thereby
27
making moot an appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court.
Upon hearing about the case, President Reagan circulated a memorandum to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. The President's memorandum suggested that any
hospital that received federal funds and denied treatment based on an
infant's handicap, as in the Infant Doe case, was engaging in discriminatory practices prohibited by section 504.28 The memorandum led first
May 27, 1982). According to one commentator, "the case appears to elevate inappropriately the

parents' interest in having the child die immediately (rather than be adopted or raised in an
institution) over the child's interest in life." J. ROBERTSON, TIlE RIGHTrs OF TIE CRITICALLY ILL
88 (1983). But see infra discussion at note 26.
24.

Commission Report, supra note 21, at 224 n.92.

25. The action was commenced by the child welfare authorities "on the complaint of some
party other than either the physicians or the parents of the child." See Id.
26. The facts of the case are not entirely clear because, following an unusual procedure, the
court ordered the record sealed. Id. The case has been subjected to considerable criticism. See.
e.g., J. ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 88; Commission Report, supra note 21, at 224; Reagan,

supra note 3, at 9-10. The Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund calls it "the most
blatant. . . infanticide episode." AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, SUMIARY
ANALYSIS OF FINAL "BABY DOE" RULES WITH RECOiIENDATIONS FOR AcTnoN 10 (Jan. 20,
1984).

There is some indication that the parents' decision to forgo treatment was defensible. As
reported in Smith, Life and Death Decisions in the Nursery: Standards and Proceduresfor Withholding Lifesaving Treatmentfrom Infants, 27 N.Y.L. Smn. L REV. 1125, 1136 n.41:
[T]he infant had multiple serious heart defects,. . . a guardian ad litum [sic] had been
appointed who declined to join in an effort to overturn the decision to withhold treatment,
and . . . a six person task force reviewed the decision not to treat and concurred with
it
....
Because so little is known about the details of the Baby Doe case it is virtually
impossible to know what standards were applied in the case. If, for example, the child
had serious heart defects in addition to the esophageal detect the surgery required may
have been contraindicated. The fact that a guardian ad litum [sic] was appointed and
that a six-person committee considered and approved the decision to withhold treatment
suggests that a significant review process was employed by the ph)sicians, hospital or
courts.
27. There is some confusion about the role of the Indiana Supreme Court in the Infant Doe
case. It has been reported that the appeal was refused because it was moot. Commission Report,
supra note 21, at 224 n.92; Smith, supra note 26, at 1136 n.41. Other commentators have suggested that the court decided the case on the merits, but affirmed without an opinion. J. RonatTSON, supra note 23, at 88; Reagan, supra note 3, at 10 ("The [trial] judge let Baby Doe starve
and die, and the Indiana Supreme Court sanctioned his decision.").
28. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to
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to a May 8, 1982, notice to health care providers "to remind affected
parties of the applicability of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. " 29 Then, apparently after viewing a sensationalized television se-

ries on the treatment of seriously ill newborns, President Reagan instructed HHS to issue a more forceful regulation."a Within days of its
promulgation, the American Academy of Pediatrics, among others,
sued for equitable relief to prevent its implementation.31 In finding for
the plaintiffs, the district court summarized the regulation:
Under the regulation a possible violation reported anonymously or otherwise via the "hotline" may be referred by the
agency in turn to state child protective authorities or to the
Department of Justice for civil rights enforcement. The regulation also authorizes immediate intervention by an HHS Office of Civil Rights investigation squad to protect the life or
health of a handicapped infant. Institutions receiving federal
financial assistance are required to give 24-hour access to hospital records and facilities during the investigation, and physicians, families and hospital staff are subject to immediate onthe-scene questioning while in the midst of providing newborn
care and treatment.3 2
The district court ruled the regulation invalid on procedural
grounds, finding it arbitrary and capricious because it was made hastily
Health Carefor HandicappedInfants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1622-23 (1984) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 84) (final rules, Jan. 12, 1984).

On April 30, 1982, President Reagan instructed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) "to notify health care providers of the applicability of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to the treatment of handicapped patients . .

.

.Regulations under this law spe-

cifically prohibit hospitals and other providers of health services receiving federal assistance from
discriminating against the handicapped." Id. at 1622.
29. Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment;
Notice of Health Care Providers,47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982), quoted in American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.D.C. 1983). See also Annas, Disconnecting the
Baby Jane Doe Hotline, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1983, at 14; Strong, Defective Infants and
Their Impact on Families: Ethical and Legal Considerations, LAW, MED. & HI3ALTII CARI ,
Sept. 1983, at 168, 169.
Although the notice immediately followed the President's memorandum, the government

stated that its notice was to "remind" health care providers of the applicability of the statute. This
is certainly inaccurate because this was the first time in the almost ten years since passage of the
Act that HHS or its predecessor, HEW, took this position on the coverage of the Act. See United
States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 152-53.
30. Annas, supra note 29, at 14.

31.

American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 395.

32.

Id. at 398.
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without adequate consideration of numerous factors.as Alternatively,
the rule was declared invalid because the Secretary failed to follow pro-

cedural requirements and issued it without public notice or time for
4
3

public comment.

Undeterred, HHS issued revised regulations less than three
months later.3 5 In substance, the revised rules reinstated the 24-hour

hotline and, more important, required medically indicated treatment
without consideration of the newborn's handicap."6
In a July 5, 1983, supplementary information, HHS attempted to
clarify instances in which nontreatment was appropriate:
Section 504 simply preserves the decision-making process customarily undertaken by physicians in any treatment decision:
will the treatment be medically beneficial to the patient and
are those benefits outweighed by any medical risk associated
with the treatment? It is only when non-medical considerations, such as subjective judgments that an unrelated handicap makes a person's life not worth living, are interjected in
the decision-making process that the Section 504 concerns
3 7

arise.

As discussed below,-" HHS's invocation of an objective medical standard, eschewing quality of life as a relevant factor, is beguilingly simple, but is violated by HHS's own explanation of its position. That position, however, remains unchanged in HHS's final rule, which was
issued on January 12, 1984.11
33. Id. at 399. The court found arbitrary and capricious the Secretary's failure to consider
several factors that the court apparently found relevant to a rule governing treatment decisions on
behalf of seriously ill newborns. Among these factors were the disruptive effects of the "hotline"
on treatment for the newborn; the impact on the newborn if the parents were to remove the infant
from the hospital, which was originally contemplated as an alternative to the hospital's assisting
the parents to discriminate against the handicapped newborn; the impact on the hospital as a
whole if financial assistance were terminated; possible malpractice and ethical problems created
for physicians; the effect on the allocation of scarce medical resources between seriously ill
newborns and other newborns and patients; and the effect of substituting HHS in place of parents
in the long-term interests of the newborn. Id. at 399-400.
34. Id. at 400-01.
35. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants, supra note 14. See also Annas, Baby Jane Doe Redux: Doctors as Child Abusers. HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 26.
36. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants, supra note 14.
37. Id. at 30,847 (emphasis added).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 240-90. See also infra note 98.
39. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Procedures and Guidelines Relating to
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Apart from the analytic inconsistency of the government's position, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and HHS have made it reasonably clear that the government contemplates treatment for infants suffering from mongolism, but not for those afflicted with anencephaly or
lack of an intestine." Less clear was HHS's original position on spina
bifida and hydrocephaly. While the July 5, 1983, supplementary information contains repeated references to mongolism, it refers only once
41
to spina bifida. Further, it cites with approval Application of Cicero,
a New York case in which a trial court ordered treatment for a child
born with spina bifida. 42 But the child in that case had a good prognosis: the lesion was low on her spine and it was likely that she would be
ambulatory and of normal intelligence. 43 It is unclear from the Secretary's reference to Cicero whether consideration of more serious physical and mental impairment might ever be relevant to a treatment decision.44 Whatever the Secretary's intention on July 5, 1983, subsequent
action by the government indicates that the government reads Cicero
broadly; that is, consideration of even very serious impairment is a violation of section 504.
Baby Jane Doe was born in Port Jefferson, New York, on October
11, 1983. She was diagnosed as suffering from multiple congenital defects: myelomeningocele,45 hydrocephaly, 46 microcephaly, 47 bilateral
Health Care for HandicappedInfants, supra note 28, at 1622. See generally Singer & Kuhse,
The Futureof Baby Jane Doe, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Mar. 1, 1984, at 17 (discussion of the final

rule). The final rule does modify the notice requirement and its investigatory procedures if the
hospital has an Infant Care Review Committee. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at
154.
40. The Surgeon General articulated his views at the hearing before Judge Gesell in American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). See Singer & Kuhse, supra

note 39, at 18-19. He took a similar position on CBS's Face the Nation on Nov. 6, 1983. HHS's
view is most clearly expressed in its July 5, 1983, proposed rules. See Nondiscriminationon the
Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care for HandicappedInfants, supra note 14.
41. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
42. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants, supra note 14, at 30,848.
43. 101 Misc. 2d at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967. See also J. ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 88.
44. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 14, at 30,848. But see id. at 30,852:
The Secretary deems the following to be examples . . . of. . . a violation of section 504.

(3) Denial of treatment for medically correctable physical anomalies in children
born with Spina Bifida, when such denial is based on anticipated mental impairment,
paralysis, or incontinence of such child, rather than on reasonable medical judgments
that treatment would be futile or too unlikely of success given complications in the particular case.

45.

Myelomeningocele involves a saccular enlargment that includes the spinal cord or nerves
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upper extremity spasticity, a prolapsed rectum, a malformed brain
stem, and additional problems indicating severe malformation of her
nervous system. 8 Her parents initially consented to a transfer of the
infant for corrective surgery to the Stony Brook University Hospital, a

state institution and recipient of federal funds. 49 After consultation
with doctors, nurses, religious counselors, and a social worker,50 the
parents chose to adopt a course of "conservative" treatment as an alternative to surgery. 5' Unlike the Infant Doe case,12 medical care and
in the sac formation and protrudes through the vertebral column.
For a description of myelomeningocele, see Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasiaof Defective
Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213, 214 n.7 (1975) (citing J. \VARKANY, CoNGENITAL MALFORMATIONS 272 (1971)).
46. "Hydrocephaly is characterized by an increase of free fluid in the cranial cavity which
results in a marked enlargement of the head ..
" Id. at 213 n.4 (citing J. WARKNY, supra
note 45, at 217). For a detailed list of the symptoms, see id. (citing J. WARtANY, supra note 45,
at 226-27). But see Brief for the State of New York at 4, United States v. University Hosp., 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984):
This condition, in combination with the microcephalic condition, indicates an "extremely
high risk for profound and severe retardation . . . to the point that (Baby Jane Dot)
would not be expected to even obtain interaction with her environment or with other
people'.... This condition was apparently present substantially prior to her birth, most
likely occurring during the fourth or fifth week of gestation. . . .[citations omitted].
47. "Microcephaly is characterized by an unusually small head and brain at birth. . . . The
condition is a result of a failure of the brain to properly form . . . and is indicative of brain
malfunction. . . . As a result, Baby Jane Doe is severely retarded ..
" Brief for the State of
New York at 4, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
48. Id. at 3-4. See also Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
49. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
50. Interestingly, in its final rule HHS allowed hospitals to refer care-withholding decisions to
a hospital review committee made up of similar individuals. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap; Proceduresand Guidelines Relating to Health Carefor HandicappedInfants. supra
note 28, at 1651-53. The President's Commission Report also favors improved communication
with parents as an alternative to judicial proceedings. Commission Report, supra note 21, at 22427. The University Hospital apparently had in place the kind of review procedure favored in the
final rules and the Commission Report. Interestingly, also, there is less than universal enthusiasm
for review committees. In its Summary Analysis, the Americans United for Life Legal Defense
Fund observed:
There is no question but that the prominent role assigned by the final rule, at the option
of each hospital, to Infant Care Review Committees is a major defeat. As we have said in
the past, studies demonstrate that the bulk of those in the medical profession continue to
harbor outdated views about the potential of people with disabilities. Giving internal hospital review committees the basic role in enforcing section 504's equal treatment requirements is like giving the job of enforcing the Voting Rights Act in the early 1960s to local
Boards of Elections in the South.
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 26, at 15.
51. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
52. See J. ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 88.
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nourishment were provided to Baby Jane.5 3 Unlike Infant Doe and
Phillip Becker,54 a California child whose parents resisted treatment,
Baby Jane was not suffering from mongolism, but was far more debilitated than those children.
Based on anonymous information, HHS filed a complaint with the
Child Protection Services, the appropriate state agency with jurisdiction over child abuse cases, alleging that the course of treatment constiits investigation, the state agency found the comtuted neglect. After
55
plaint groundless.
Thereafter, A. Lawrence Washburn, Jr., a Vermont resident with
"no disclosed connection with Baby Jane Doe or her family," filed an
action in the New York Supreme Court to compel surgery.50 Washburn
was replaced by William E. Weber, a court-appointed guardian ad litem. In turn, Weber petitioned the court for authorization to consent to
surgery on behalf of the infant. 57 The trial court found that she was "in
need of immediate surgical procedures to preserve her life."' 8 Four
days later, on October 20, 1983, the appellate division entered a stay of
the trial court's order. On the following day, the court unanimously
reversed the trial court's order on narrow grounds:
It is manifest . . . that this is not a case where an infant is

being deprived of medical treatment to achieve a quick and
supposedly merciful death. .

.

.These concededly concerned

and loving parents have made an informed, intelligent, and
reasonable determination based upon and supported by medical authority. On this record, and in light of all the surrounding circumstances, we find the parents' determination to be in
59
the best interest of the infant.
53.

Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.

54.

In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 949

(1980). Interestingly, a trial court subsequently took guardianship for Phillip from his parents,
creating the opportunity for the couple who had been caring for Phillip to consent to surgery. See
Guardianship of Phillip Becker, Superior Court, Santa Clara County, Cal. No. 10198 (Aug.
1981), discussed in Annas, A Wonderful Case and an Irrational Tragedy: The Phillip Becker
Case Continues, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1982, at 25.

55.

United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 147.

56.

Id. at 146. See also Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d at 209, 456 NE.2d at 1187,

469 N.Y.S.2d at 64 ("Rather than pursuing the procedures prescribed in the Family Court Act,
he applied directly to a Justice of the [New York] Supreme Court.").

57. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 610.
58. Id.
59. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
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The court of appeals affirmed, 60 but rejected the approach of the
appellate division. Instead, it alluded to the "unusual, and sometimes
offensive, activities" by those attempting to substitute their judgment
for that of the parents."' The court concluded that the legislature had
provided for a course of intervention into family matters that was limited by due process requirements. Specifically, New York provides that
neglect proceedings are to be commenced only by a child protection
agency or "a person on the court's direction,"62 a provision intended to
protect the family from proceedings "casually initiated. ' 63 The court
found that the supreme court erred when it allowed a stranger to commence proceedings, and thereby, to "catapult [himself] into the very
heart of a family circle, there to challenge the most private and most
precious responsibility vested in the parents for the care and nurture of
their children-and at the very least to force the parents to incur the
not inconsiderable expenses of extended litigation."'64
The court's decision is only partially procedural. In effect, the
court found that the original plaintiff lacked standing because he did
not come within the relevant statute providing for specific parties who
might initiate proceedings.6 5 But the opinion indicates that due process
privacy interests may be violated by allowing strangers to call into
court the family of a seriously ill newborn. 6
Despite dissimilarities between Baby Jane Doe's and Infant Doe's
handicaps and treatment, the government6 7 and at least one right-to60. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186. 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, aFg 95
A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, cert. denied. 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983).

61.

Id. at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S. at 64.

62.

Id. (citing the Family Court Act, N.Y. Dobi. REL LAW § 1032 (McKinney 1983)).

63. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, N.Y.S.2d at 64.
64.

Id. at 210, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64. ("[Section 10 of the Family Court
Act] is designed to provide a due process of law for determining when the state, through its family

court, may intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are
properly met.") The tension between the parental right to privacy and the state parenspatridae
role of protecting children has been noted elsewhere. See. e.g.. Commission Report, supra note 21,
at 213-16. Some advocates of aggressive treatment for seriously ill newborns give virtually no

weight to the parental right. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 45, at 216.
67. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). a fid. 729 F.2d 144
(2d Cir. 1984). That Baby Jane Doe's case was viewed by the government as a test case for its

section 504 strategy was revealed by Surgeon General Koop: "According to a report in the
London Sunday Times, Dr. Koop has said that he is not so much interested in Baby Jane Doc as
in 'the idea of her' as a way of 'fighting for the principle of this country that every life is individually and uniquely sacred.'" Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39. at 21.
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life advocate 68 chose to make Baby Jane Doe a test case for the section
504 strategy suggested in HHS's July 5, 1983, Interim Final Rule and
supplementary information. On the day after the New York Supreme
Court Appellate Division decision, HHS requested Baby Jane Doe's
medical records from University Hospital.6 9 After access was refused,
HHS filed a complaint on November 2, 1983, naming University Hospital as a defendant in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York and requesting an order to compel production of
Baby Jane Doe's medical records.70 Jurisdiction was alleged under section 504.71 After various motions were filed on an expedited basis, the
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.7 2 On November 18, 1983, the government filed a notice of appeal to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.7 3 On February 23, 1984, the Second Circuit
affirmed. 74 The government has abandoned efforts to secure the infant's
medical records because5 she was able to leave the hospital and to go
7
home with her parents.
The University Hospital litigation illustrates what this article has
labelled the government's section 504 strategy. First, the action and
HHS's original notice to health care providers evidence the govern68. The following account of Washburn's "interest" in the case is provided in the newsletter of
Concern for Dying, CONCERN FOR DYING NEWSLETTER, Winter 1984, at 3:
Lawyer A. Lawrence Washburn, unrelated to the infant but actively involved in "rightto-life" advocacy, applied directly to a justice of the New York Supreme Court, the lower
court, to intervene.
. . .[After the decision by the New York Court of Appeals,] [t]he matter, unfortu-

nately, was not so easily laid to rest. Washburn . . .requested that the Federal District
Court in Albany appoint another legal guardian for the infant, but Judge Roger Miner
ruled that there was no need for such an appointment and, in fact, fined Washburn $500
for attempting "to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase the cost of

litigation."
For the views of Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund, see generally, AmERICANS

26, at 9-16 (approving of similar aggressive
tactics).
69. Brief for the State of New York at 9-10, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.
See also 729 F.2d at 147-48.
70. Brief for the State of New York at 10, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.
See also 729 F.2d at 148.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1983).
72. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 729 F.2d 144
(2d Cir. 1984).
73. Brief for the State of New York at 3, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.
74. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), affg 575 F. Supp. 607
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note

75.

See U.S. Drops 'Baby Jane Doe' Effort, supra note 18.
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ment's definition of discrimination; i.e., it is unlawful for a federally
assisted institution to withhold nutrition or treatment to correct a lifethreatening condition because an infant is handicapped
if sustenance or
76
treatment are not contraindicated by the handicap.
The government asserts that section 504 establishes a substantive

standard of decision in treatment cases. In effect, because the consideration of the handicap is forbidden, whenever treatment would be pro-

vided for an otherwise
healthy child, it must also be provided for the
77
infant.
handicapped
Second, the government's stance is that federal courts are appro-

priate fora in which to litigate treatment cases. In University Hospital,
the government sought discovery of medical records only.7 8 But HHS's
July 5, 1983, supplementary information plotted the government's strategic alternatives and makes clear that termination of federal assistance was not the only sanction to be sought under section 504 and that
the cooperation of state and local government was to be enlisted.79 The
76. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants. supra note 14, at 30,851.
Under section 504 "it is unlawful for a recipient or Federal financial assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment
required to correct a life-threatening condition, if:
(i) the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and
(2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medically
contraindicated.
Id.
77. The cases that require treatment under the government's theory differ depending on the
spokesperson. President Reagan argues that all lives are of equal value and, therefore, require
treatment without regard to handicap. Reagan, supra note 3, at 11-12. Surgeon General Koop
took a more moderate approach while arguing before Judge Gesell in American Academy of Pediatrics.Koop stated that some handicaps, even where biological life can be sustained for a substantial period of time, are relevant to a decision to deny treatment. Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39,
at 18-19. In University Hospital,the infant was not suffering from one of the anomalies that Koop
thought permitted nontreatment; despite that, the government conceded that it had not found any
discrimination against Baby Jane Doe in the chosen course of treatment. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 148. See also infra note 98.
78. Brief for the United States at 12-15, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.
79.

The Secretary intends to rely heavily on the voluntary cooperation of State and local
agencies, which are closest to the scene of violations, and which have traditionally played
the key role in the investigation of complaints of child abuse and neglect. This will not
exclude, of course, a vigorous federal role in enforcing the federal civil rights that are at
issue.
Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 84) (interim final rule Mar. 7, 1983). For a critique of HHS's threat that federal
assistance might be terminated if HHS found a violation of section 504, see Commission Report,
supra note 21, at 224-27.
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Secretary apparently expects state agencies to intervene to require
treatment in most cases; but HHS is fully prepared, in effect, to make
a federal case out of
treatment decisions if state agency action is con80
sidered insufficient.
The first issue raised by these cases is whether Congress intended
to bring into federal court cases like Baby Jane Doe's when it enacted
section 504. The hospital argued in the federal case that it was not a
recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of the Act.
The district court gave that argument short shrift"' but agreed with the
hospital that the papers before it clearly demonstrated that the hospital
was not discriminating against a handicapped person. The court observed that the hospital was willing to treat the infant if the parents
would consent to surgery but that it lacked the legal right to do so
absent consent. Therefore, the hospital failed to perform the surgery,
not because of the infant's handicap, but because her parents refused to
consent."2 The court found further that the conservative course of treatment was "a reasonable one based on due consideration of the medical
options available and on a genuine concern for the best interests of the
child."8s3 In effect, the district court assumed that Congress intended to
create jurisdiction under section 504 over cases involving medical treatment, but held that the hospital's failure to act could not be construed
as a breach of duty. Section 504, on that view, failed to create a duty
to act affirmatively.
This argument is only superficially appealing. As the government
argued to the Second Circuit, the hospital is in a position to sue in state
court to compel the parents to consent to treatment that is medically
80.
For those cases where district federal action appears helpful, the Secretary will have at
his disposal the usual means of federal civil rights enforcement. The interim final rule

makes it possible for the Secretary

. .

.to make immediate referrals to the Department

of Justice for such legal action as may be necessary to save the life of a handicapped

child who is subjected to discrimination by a recipient.
Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap, supra note 79, at 9631, reprinted In Commission
Report, supra note 21, at 469.
81. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 612-13. The Second Circuit found that
question to be a far more difficult one than did the district court. See United States v. University
Hosp., 729 F.2d at 151. The Second Circuit also noted the fact that the government had not
presented evidence that Medicare or Medicaid funds were provided specifically for the infant care
program in the hospital, as opposed to the hospital generally. Id. It suggested that the govern-

ment's position appeared inconsistent with the position it had recently taken before the Supreme
Court in Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984). See 729 F.2d at 151.
82. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 614.
83. Id. at 615.

1984]

EXECUTIVE POWER

appropriate. The government contended that the failure of the hospital
to do so because of the infant's handicap was violative of section 504.1
The hospital relied on the Supreme Court as authority for its assertion
that section 504 does not require affirmative action to alter existing
programs significantly.8 5 That authority would seem inapposite where,
as in University Hospital, there is little question that the hospital
would have sought judicial intervention in other instances." The government refuted the contention that acquiescence in a parental decision
can never be discriminatory by hypothesizing that a court would be
quick to find discrimination if the hospital sought judicial intervention
to compel parental consent in cases involving white infants but not
black infants. The government argued by analogy that the hospital
would be guilty of discrimination if it sought judicial intervention only
for children with the capacity for normal development, not for those
likely to be retarded or otherwise handicapped. 7
While the district court's reasoning is suspect, there are more fundamental reasons for rejecting the government's attempted use of section 504 to compel medical treatment. The Second Circuit gave a far
more detailed analysis of congressional intent in enacting section 504
than did the district court. For the Second Circuit, the issue was: "Did
Congress intend section 504 to reach the conduct HHS seeks to investigate," '8 that is, treatment decisions for seriously ill newborns. The district court did not hold that section 504 was inapplicable to such decisions, but instead held that the hospital's conduct could not be
84. Brief for the United States at 17-19, 27-30, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d
144.

85. Brief for the State of New York at 34, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144
(citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (woman rightly denied
admission to a nursing program because her serious hearing deficiency meant she was not "other-

wise qualified" for the program; section 504 does not compel a recipient of federal financial assistance to undertake affirmative action)).

86. The Second Circuit also relied on the Davis holding that section 504 does not compel
recipients of federal financial assistance to undertake affirmative action:

[T]he Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he language and structure of the Rchabilitation Act of 1973 reflect the recognition by Congress of the distinction betwcen the even-

handed treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome
the disabilities caused by handicaps." . . . The Court concluded that "neither the language, purpose, nor history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmativc-action
obligation on all recipients of federal funds....

United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 160 (citations omitted).
But the affirmative action required in Davis is distinguishable from that involved in the instant case, .at least as a matter of degree.
87. Brief for the United States at 27-30, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.

88. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 150.
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construed as section 504 discrimination. 9
The Second Circuit amassed considerable support for its view that
section 504 was not intended to encompass treatment decisions for seriously ill newborns. First, it cited the curious reversals within the federal
agency's interpretation of the statutory provision. 0 For example, in
1976, HHS's predecessor agency, HEW, announced that section 504
did not empower it to promulgate rules regulating the rights of institutionalized patients. 91 Further, HEW's original regulations were limited
to making services available, e.g., by modifying facilities to give physical access to handicapped patients. 2 The appellate court did not feel
that subsequent clarification of the federal regulations supported the
government's position.9"
HHS first contended that section 504 contemplated treatment of
seriously ill newborns after President Reagan's 1982 memorandum to
HHS in response to reports about the Infant Doe case. But even after
its May 18, 1982, notice to health care providers,94 HHS shifted its
interpretation of section 504. Initially, after recognizing that a hospital
may not have full control over a parental refusal to consent, HHS
warned that section 504 may be violated if the health care provider
counseled parents to make a discriminatory decision or allowed an infant being discriminatorily denied treatment to remain in the hospital.98 In its March, 1983, interim final rule, HHS contended that section 504 required recipients of federal financial assistance to display a
poster in nurseries and maternal wards warning that failure to feed and
care for handicapped infants violates federal law; that the regulation
authorized a 24-hour handicapped hotline; and that it permitted vigorous federal investigation including access to medical records at times
89.

United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 614-15.

90. 729 F.2d at 152-53. By contrast, a court should be guided by the administering agency's
long-standing, consistent interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., Frank Diehi Farms v. Secretary of
Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 1983) ("We are more reluctant to defer to an agency's
more recent interpretation as authoritative when it conflicts with earlier pronouncements of the
agency.").
91. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 152 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548, 29,559
(1976)).
92. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 41 Fed. Reg. 19,548, 19,567 (1976) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.52) (proposed rules July 18, 1976).
93. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 154.
94. DiscriminatingAgainst the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment;
Notice of Health Care Providers,47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982).
95. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 152 (citing DiscriminatingAgainst the
Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment; Notice of Health Care Providers,
supra note 94, at 26,027).
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beyond normal business hoursY6 Following the successful challenge to
the regulation by the American Academy of Pediatrics, 7 HHS made
minor revisions in its proposed rule, including a list of specific instances
in which the agency believed that nontreatment would constitute discrimination.98 Finally, in its most recent rule, HHS again modified its
interpretation of section 504 and its notice requirement. 9 Given the
several agency interpretations of section 504, the court concluded, quite

moderately, that there was no long-standing and consistent interpretation by an administering agency to which it might otherwise have
looked for guidance.100
96. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 153 (citing amendments to 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.61, contained in Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap. supra note 79. at 9630-31).
97. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
98. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants. supra note 14, at 30,846-47. At this time, HHS specifically mentioned only anencephaly
or intracranial bleeding as instances where denial of treatment was permissible. By contrast, during testimony before Judge Gesell, the American Academy of Pediatrics identified three instances
in which nontreatment was appropriate: the anencephalic infant; the infant with intracranial
bleeding; and the infant born without an intestine. See Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39, at 18-19.
During his testimony before the House of Representatives, Surgeon General Koop mentioned two
instances where nontreatment was appropriate:
Medicine may never have all the solutions to all the problems that occur at birth. I personally foresee no medical solution to a cephalodymus or an anencephalic child. The first
is a one-headed twin; the second, the child with virtually no functioning brain at all. In
these cases the prognosis is an early and merciful death by natural causes. . . .For such
infants, neither medicine nor law can be of any help. And neither medicine nor law
should prolong these infants' process of dying.
Commission Report, supra note 21, at 219 n.81.
During oral argument before the district court the government conceded that, despite considerable discovery of Baby Jane Doe's medical records (the records had been produced during the
state court proceedings), it had found no discrimination based on her handicap. United States v.
University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 148. There are two possible reasons for the government's findings:
(1)the limited "conservative" treatment being provided was adequate treatment in any spina
bifida case; or (2) aggressive treatment might be unnecessary in some cases, like Baby Jane Doe's,
where other anomalies gave the newborns a very poor prognosis. The first position is inconsistent
with the government's initial efforts to have the Child Protection Services declare Baby Jane Doe
a neglected child. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 147. The second position would
mean that, despite the equal value of all lives, not all children suffering from spina bifida need to
be treated equally. See infra text accompanying notes 241-60.
99.
For example, HHS adopted the recommendation of several commentators that the federal government encourage, but not require, hospitals to establish Infant Care Review
Committees "to assist the health care provider in the development of standards, policies
and procedures for providing treatment to handicapped infants and in making decisions
concerning medically beneficial treatment in specific cases.'
United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 154 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(a), 49 Fed. Reg. at
1651 (1984)).
100. 729 F.2d at 154. The Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund found objectiona-
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The Second Circuit also found the express statutory language inconclusive. 0 1 Despite some ambiguity, it held that Baby Jane Doe was
a "handicapped individual" within the statutory definition. 0 2 But the
court had more difficulty with the intertwined issues of whether she
was an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual and whether she
was "subjected to discrimination.' 0 3 As observed by the court, it is not
entirely clear what "otherwise qualified" means in the context of a
medical treatment decision. However, the court notes that the handicap
gives rise to the need for treatment, and, as the defendants argued, "it

would be pointless to inquire whether a patient who was affected by a
medical treatment decision was, 'solely by reason of his handicap,...
subjected to discrimination.' "o104 The court's reasoning thus was that
the statutory language does not seem to encompass a case like Baby
Jane Doe. In effect, the statute sets up three criteria: (1) existence of a
ble the final rule because HHS abandoned its earlier position that section 504 creates "a universal
duty to provide nutrition." AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 26,
at 8. The author agrees that HHS has taken various positions on the content of section 504, each
with no reference to statutory language or history. The mere fact that HHS felt free to negotiate
on the "content" of section 504 suggests how far HHS was from the intent of Congress and that it
was drafting on a clean slate a medical code for the treatment of newborns. Further, the standard
created by HHS that all treatment must be provided unless "medically contraindicated" has been
described by one commentator as "unintelligible." Fost, Putting Hospitals on Notice, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Aug. 1982, at 5, 6.
101. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156-57.
102. Id. at 155-56. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. 1983), provides: "[T]he term 'handicapped
individual' means . . . any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. .. ."
103. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156. Although the term "otherwise quali.
fied" defies precise definition, it can be explained by illustration. For example, a handicapped
candidate for a graduate program with an undergraduate record equivalent to the records of students who were admitted to the program would be "otherwise qualified" and could not be denied
admission if admission decisions were based on undergraduate record. See, e.g., Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761
(2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
See also Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982); Simon v. St. Louis County, 497 F.
Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
This does not mean, however, that a handicap is irrelevant in all cases:
[A]n institution is not required to disregard the disabilities of a handicapped applicant,
provided the handicap is relevant to reasonable qualifications for acceptance, or to make
substantial modifications in its reasonable standards or program to accommodate handicapped individuals but may take an applicant's handicap into consideration, along with
all other relevant factors, in determining whether she is qualified for admission.
United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156 (quoting Doe v. New York University, 666
F.2d at 775).
104. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156.
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handicap; (2) an otherwise qualified patient; and (3) discrimination
based on the handicap. But a seriously ill newborn is only otherwise
qualified for treatment because of the existence of the handicap. For
there to be "discrimination," there must be at least two classes of patients. Here there was only one, those suffering from the handicap; that
is, the only patients qualified for closure of the spine are those suffering
from spina bifida. The government argued to the Second Circuit that in
effect there were two classes of patients: those suffering from spina
bifida with a reasonable prognosis for intellectual development and
those like Baby Jane Doe who suffered additional anomalies that made
severe retardation probable."' °
The Second Circuit rejected the government's position for two reasons. First, the court stated that the plain meaning of "otherwise qualified" was "geared toward relatively static programs or activities such
as education . . . employment

. . .

and transportation systems," not

"the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions."'u c
Second, the court viewed the government's interpretation of "subject to
discrimination" as an oversimplification that would require lengthy litigation and conflicting expert opinions before a determination of dis10 7
crimination could be made in individual cases.
Finally, the court addressed the statutory history, which proved
overwhelmingly that Congress "never contemplated that section 504
would apply to treatment decisions of this nature."10 8 As pointed out by
the state, section 504 is codified in Title 29 of the United States Code,
generally governing labor law, and the purpose of the Rehabilitation
Act was "to develop and implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living."10 9 Thus, the Act specifically contemplated a goal of equal
105. Id.
106. Id.
107.
[Such determinations] would invariably require lengthy litigation primarily involving
conflicting expert testimony to determine whether a decision to treat, or not to treat, or to
litigate or not to litigate, was based on a "bona fide medical judgment," however that
phrase might be defined. Before ruling that Congress intended to spawn this type of litigation under section 504, we would want more proof than is apparent from the face of
the statute.
Id. at 157.
108. Id.
109. Brief for the State of New York at 30, United States v. University Hosp.. 729 F.2d 144
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 701).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 17:95

opportunities,110 rather than standards of medical

employment

treatment.
As the court in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler concluded, "[a]s far as can be determined, no congressional committee or

member of the House or Senate ever even suggested that section 504
would be used to monitor medical treatment of defective newborn infants or establish standards for preserving a particular quality of
life."' 1 By contrast, during consideration of 1974 amendments to the
Act, the Senate Committee addressed the Act's coverage exclusively in

terms of access or admission to federally assisted programs." 2 Moreover, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare previously had
concluded that the agency was not empowered under section 504 to

promulgate rules on the rights of institutionalized patients to receive or
3
to refuse medical treatment."
The Second Circuit noted that the legislative history of section 504
showed that medical issues were considered only in connection with
proposed programs to benefit particular groups of handicapped persons
and also noted that the Congress eventually was forced to drop those
provisions because they intruded into the medical realm." 4 The court
further recognized that the legislative record included examples of individuals who may have been denied benefits of federally assisted services
because of mental or physical handicaps: the child denied admission to
110.

All the provisions of the Act relate to education, training, vocational rehabilitation

and employability. There is no evidence that the intention of Congress was for section
504 to be used as a basis for federal intervention in medical decisionmaking concerning
any individual, much less the medical treatment decisions of the parents of seriously ill
infants based upon consultation with their doctors.
Brief for the State of New York at 30-31, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.
111. 561 F. Supp. at 401.
112. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CON.
& AD. NEws 6373, 6388-89. See also infra text accompanying note 115.
113. Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance,
Nondiscriminationon Basis of Handicap. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548 (1976). See also United States v.
University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 152.
114.
Interestingly, the only consideration of medical issues that occurred in connection with
the 1973 legislation did not involve the nondiscrimination provision that would eventually
become section 504. In the first two versions of the legislation, congress had created several categorical programs to benefit target populations including those with cnd-stage
renal disease and those with severe spinal cord injuries. In vetoing each of the first two
versions of the Rehabilitation Act, President Nixon took issue with what he perceived to
be congress's attempts to extend what was essentially a vocational program into the medical realm. .

.

.Ultimately, congress was forced to back down.

United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 157.
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school; the aged person denied admission to a nursing home; individuals
denied access to various federal programs because their handicap made
any employment unfeasible; and individuals who have completed vocational training and are nonetheless subject to discrimination. By contrast, the record is devoid of discussion of treatment of seriously ill
newborns." 5
Furthermore, as observed in the challenge by the American Academy of Pediatrics, no medical association or religious group testified
during the hearings, despite the implications that such a rule would
have for those groups."1 6 The Second Circuit also cited post-enactment
history that "indicates both that congress was primarily concerned with
affording the handicapped access to federally-funded programs and activities, and that congress never envisioned that HEW''1(or HHS) would
attempt to apply section 504 to treatment decisions."
The failure of Congress to mention a specific application of a statute does not nece~sarily make the statute inapplicable.118 However,
even if the government could have argued that section 504's language
applied to medical treatment, other factors weighed against its application to cases like Baby Jane Doe. First, Medicare and Medicaid payments were the alleged federal financial assistance that triggered section 504,119 but Medicare provisions state that "[n]othing in this

subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of
medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided."1 20
That position has been reiterated elsewhere by Congress.12 ' Again, the
115. Id. at 158.
116. 561 F. Supp. at 401.
117. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 159.
[T]he House Subcommittee on Select Education conducted oversight hearings on the section 504 regulations in September 1977. During these hearings, the subcommittee heard
testimony covering a wide range of topics from witnesses representing the federal government, state governments, education agencies, and organizations serving handicapped people. Throughout the hearings, the issue of program accessibility was a recurrent theme.
Id.
118. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories. 460 U.S. 150. 159 n.18
(1983); United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1085 (1980).
119. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 611; Brief for the United States at 9,
United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976).
121. See S. Rep. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 256-58 (1972). The government did not specifically address these provisions, but in distinguishing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322
(1982) (in assessing whether person involuntarily committed has received minimally adequate
training, court must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional), the
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history surrounding section 504 offers no support that Congress intended to overrule those provisions.

Second, the Second Circuit rejected the government's interpretation of section 504 in part on the reasoning that a federal court should
not presume on a silent record that Congress intended to intrude upon
a matter traditionally occupied by the states.122 The government's reading of section 504 would greatly expand federal court jurisdiction, and
it is highly unlikely that Congress meant to do so in light of its silence
on that issue.123 Although the government's complaint requested only
1 24
access to medical records and not an order compelling treatment,
HHS's July 5, 1983, supplementary information made perfectly clear
that the government would seek full federal court adjudication of treatment cases, thereby bypassing state courts and remedies in cases that
HHS deemed appropriate. Thus, the government implicitly was asking
government argued as follows: "[A] health care decision based on a bona fide, professionally, [sic]
acceptable medical judgment would not be based on handicap, which is all that Section 504 forbids." Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144. Thus,
according to the government, the government's intrusion in a case would not amount to "control
over the practice of medicine" because a doctor when discriminating is not practicing medicine.
That interpretation, of course, would ignore the statutory phrase "or the manner." Again, the
government cites no authority for the questionable distinction. But the hardest problem for the
government is that its position is circular. HHS eschews decisions made on subjective quality-oflife judgments. Presumably, one is not practicing medicine if she does so. But to make sense out of
the proposed rules necessarily brings one back to those considerations:
Perhaps-and the guesswork required is what makes this aspect of the regulation
undesirable-the second clause [allowing denial of treatment if it would be medically
contraindicated] was intended to refer to conditions that are so hopeless, or a life so
devoid of quality or meaningful existence, that it would be medically contraindicated to
expose the child to an uncomfortable or intrusive treatment, even though it would prolong
life, or perhaps because it would prolong life. If this is what is meant, a second objection
arises: namely, this is not a medical reason for withholding treatment but an ethical one.
If by "medical contraindication" the regulation means a condition which, in the
opinion of a doctor, is not sufficiently correctable to warrant treatment, then we are back
at square one: a doctor may permissibly withhold treatment simply by expressing an
opinion on the value of the child's life.
Fost, supra note 100, at 6-7. Ordinarily, one refers to actual practice within the medical community in establishing norms for the practitioner. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793
(1968); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). But
that cannot be the meaning of the government's "medically contraindicated" standard; as recognized by Dr. Koop, a majority of doctors admit that they would honor the request of parents of a
seriously ill newborn to withhold treatment. Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39, at 18-19.
122. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 160.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
124. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 609; Brief for the United States at 7,
12, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.
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the federal district court for a radical expansion of federal court
jurisdiction. 12 5
Traditionally, as HHS recognized, cases involving treatment of
minors and incompetents have been within the jurisdiction of state
courts. 2" Moreover, courts universally have recognized a right of parents to make medical decisions on behalf of their children. 21 It is now
beyond debate that this parental right is part of a federally guaranteed
right to privacy, and, therefore, a state's effort to supersede parental
discretion may create federal question jurisdiction. 12 But almost all of
the cases involving state power to override parental refusal to have a
child treated have been brought in state court.' 29 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that it lacked jurisdiction for want of a substantial federal question in a case in which parents objected to compulsory vaccination of their child. 130 Recourse to state courts in such cases is un125. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care far Handicapped
Infants. supra note 14, at 30,849: "For those cases where direct federal action appears helpful, the
Department will have at its disposal the usual means of federal civil rights enforcement." See also
29 U.S.C. § 794a (Supp. 1983) (setting forth available remedies).
126. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care far Handicapped
Infants. supra note 14, at 30,846. See supra note 79.
127. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1941); In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert denied. 445 U.S.
949 (1980); In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
128. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (rights of parents to know of their
immature minor's decision to have an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (same);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right of parents to determine education of their children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (same).
129. See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965); In re
Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); In
re Benjamin (Minor), Sup. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal., No. J914419, Feb. 15, 1979; In re Ivey,
319 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth, 274
Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); People exrel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769
(1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982): Maine
Medical Center v. Houle, Sup. Ct. Civil Action No. 74-145 (Cumberland Co.. Me. 1974); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1979); Brooklyn Hosp. v. Torres, 45 Misc. 2d
914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970);
In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1962); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
Parents and doctors have also been prosecuted in state court when the child has been injured or
died as a result of the failure to treat. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 699, 261 A.2d
294 (1969); Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920); Eaglen v. State, 249 Ind. 144, 231
N.E.2d 147 (1967); Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976); State v.
Staples, 126 Minn. 396, 148 N.W. 283 (1914); Matthews v. State, 240 Miss. 189, 126 So. 2d 245
(1961); State v. Stehr, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676 (1913), affd on rehearing, 94 Neb. 151, 142
N.W. 670 (1913).
130. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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doubtedly routine because of state statutes treating those cases as

neglect. 131 Such statutes are part of the state role as parens patriae,at
the core of the state police power.'" 2

Further, the parental right of privacy will usually be raised defensively when the state or guardian seeks treatment for the newborn.133
In that context, the federal question will not appear on the face of the
complaint, and, therefore, the district court will lack jurisdiction under
the well-pleaded complaint rule. 34 In addition, in the related areas of
domestic relations and child custody, federal courts have abstained
from deciding such cases despite the existence of federal jurisdiction. 35

Further, apart from the federal right of privacy of parents in governing
family decisions, intervention is justified when action is necessary to
protect the child's interests. Those cases are decided by reference to the
best interest standard, which is typically a matter of state law. 30
Adoption of the government's interpretation of section 504 would
create federal jurisdiction over many treatment decisions now left to
131. "The duty [to provide necessary medical assistance to a helpless minor child] ... is now
imposed by statute in every state." Robertson, supra note 45, at 218. See also id. at 222-24.
132. See supra note 10.
133. See. e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cerl. denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980) (action by juvenile probation department alleging that Phillip Becker was
being deprived of the necessities of life); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274
Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (action brought by hospital to allow it to give pregnant woman
blood transfusions over her refusal to consent; separate action by county department to have fetus
declared a deprived child).
134. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
135.
Traditionally, it has been the policy of federal courts to avoid assumption of jurisdiction
in this species of litigation [state domestic relations cases]. "The whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states
and not to the laws of the United States." . . . Indeed, this court has explicitly held there
is no federal diversity jurisdiction in a domestic relations case involving a child ...
"As a matter of policy and comity, [such cases are] local problems [which] should
be decided in state courts. Domestic relations is a field peculiarly suited to state regulation and control, and peculiarly unsuited to control by federal courts."
Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted). See also C,
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 25 (4th ed. 1983).
136. See, e.g.. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. dented,
454 U.S. 858 (1981); cases cited supra note 129. See also Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis of
Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 Mo. L. REv. 337, 361-68 (1981); Smith, supra
note 26, at 1131-38. Organ transplant cases provide an interesting contrast to the cases controlled
by the best interest standard. There courts have incorporated the substituted judgment standard to
allow organ donations under carefully circumscribed conditions, even if the donation is not in the
incompetent's best interest. See Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted
Judgment Doctrine. 76 COLUhI. L. REV. 48 (1976).
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state courts. As in University Hospital, the government would be able
to proceed as a plaintiff, not only to discover medical records or to terminate federal funds, but also to coerce treatment. Whether the government would defer to the state agencies and courts apparently would
depend on the extent of compliance of the state with the government's
view of the merits in an individual case. But the decision to proceed in
federal court, according to HHS, is within its own discretion.137
Under the government's reading of section 504, however, the government is not the only potential federal plaintiff. Federal courts have
been virtually unanimous in holding that section 504 creates a private
right of action on behalf of a handicapped individual, and that a plaintiff may proceed directly in federal courts without exhausting administrative remedies.13 8 Typical is the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pushkin
39
in which the court affirmed a
v. Regents of University of Colorado,1
district court's decree directing that the plaintiff, a physician suffering
from multiple sclerosis, be admitted to the next class at the University's
psychiatric residency program. The court applied the four-pronged test
of Cort v. Ash: 140 first, the plaintiff must be "one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted"; second, there must be evidence of the legislative intent to create the private right of action;
third, a private right of action must be consistent with the underlying
legislative scheme; and fourth, the area must not be "basically the concern of the States, so that it would be14 inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law."
Given the congressional history, specifically stating that Congress
intended to "permit a judicial remedy through a private action,"" 42 it is
137. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of HandicapRelating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants. supra note 14, at 30,849.

138.

See, e.g.. Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982); Doe v. New York Univ., 666

F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.
1981); Helms v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, reh'g denied, 664 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980);
Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980). vacated on other grounds. 451

U.S. 390 (1981); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), revd
on other grounds, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th
Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). The only disputed
question is whether a plaintiff may secure damages in addition to injunctive relief. See Pushkin v.
Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1377 n.2. See also 29 U.S.C. § 794a (Supp. 1983).
139. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
140. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

141.

658 F.2d at 1378 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78).

142. 658 F.2d at 1378 (quoting S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, reprinted In
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEnvs 6373, 6391 (1974)).
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not surprising that the courts of appeals have been virtually unanimous
in finding a private right of action. Thus, according to the government's
interpretation of section 504, as long as the defendant-hospital was a
recipient of federal financial assistance-and almost all hospitals would
qualify because, along with University Hospital, they receive reimbursement under the Medicare and Medicaid programs-and an infant's treatment was arguably affected by the hospital's action or inaction, the infant's representative could proceed in federal court.1 43
If adopted, the government's position not only would have allowed
treatment decisions to be litigated in federal court, but also would have
created by logical extension a limited federal medical malpractice action. The most obvious private cause of action would be to compel
treatment for an infant or incompetent, like Baby Jane Doe, who arguably was denied surgery because of her handicap. But HHS's original May 18, 1982, notice also required that health care providers who
counsel parents "should not discriminate by encouraging patients to
make decisions, which, if made by the health care provider, would be
discriminatory under section 504, "144 presumably including placing the
infant in foster care or allowing his adoption. Assume that hospital personnel failed to inform parents of a seriously ill newborn of the existence of such alternatives, that the parents refused to consent to surgery in a case like Baby Jane Doe's, and that failure to perform
surgery resulted in the infant's death. According to HHS, a duty exists
under section 504 to inform parents of alternatives to nontreatment. As
long as the parents could establish that the breach of the hospital's
duty to inform caused them to refuse treatment and that their refusal
led to the infant's death, the parents could have a federal cause of action pursuant to section 504.145

The foregoing analysis suggests that Congress never contemplated
the use to which the government seeks to put section 504. The government's position requires an extravagant distortion of the law, the creation of federal jurisdiction out of whole cloth. That is not to suggest,
143.

As discussed by the Second Circuit in United States v. University Hosp., whether the

hospital was a recipient of federal financial assistance was not entirely clear on the record. Interestingly, the government's position on the meaning of those terms was inconsistent with the position it had taken recently in Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984). See 729 F.2d at
151.
144. DiscriminatingAgainst the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment;
Notice of Health Care Providers,supra note 94.
145. Cf Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 1 10 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
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however, that Congress could not create jurisdiction over bona fide
cases of discrimination. In fact, Congress has enacted legislation that,
in effect, enacts the government's interpretation of section 504.140 This
legislation and HHS's interpretation of section 504 raise a second important issue. The government's position, although not without ambiguity, would establish a national treatment standard not necessarily consistent with the approach taken by state courts.
THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT

Cases involving the right to refuse medical treatment are of recent
origin, almost all having been decided in the past ten years. 147 Some
146. Child Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 98-457 (Oct. 9, 1984).
147. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983)
(whether removal of intravenous feeding tube from persistently comatose patient was homicide);
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (whether comatose wife may
be removed from respirator by husband as her guardian); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (whether hospital must honor a competent
terminally ill patient's request to be withdrawn from respirator); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015
(La. 1982) (whether persistently vegetative newborn could be withdrawn from respirator under
restrictive Louisiana statute, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.1(A), (C) (West Supp. 1984));
Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982) (whether prior judicial authorization
is required to withdraw treatment from a seriously ill newborn); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980) (whether senile patient may be withdrawn from dial)sis consistent with family's expression of patient's judgment); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (whether chemotherapy was required for a severely retarded 67-year-old ward of the state who was suffering from leukemia); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) (whether prior judicial authorization is necessary before
entering a "no-code" (order not to resuscitate) in a comatose patient's medical record); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (whether persistently vegetative patient may be removed from a respirator consistent with guardian ad litem's perception of
the patient's wishes); In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (whether guardian for
persistently vegetative patient may insist on removal of nasogastrie tube from patient), cert.
granted, 470 A.2d 418 (1983); In re Quackenbush, 156 NJ. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978)
(whether hospital must honor elderly patient's refusal to consent to surgical removal of gangrenous extremity, despite fact that death would result from nontreatment); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, (whether blood transfusions must be provided for a severely retarded cancer patient; also, whether a persistently vegetative patient may be withdrawn
from a respirator consistent with his recent statements on that subject), cert. denied. 454 U.S. 858
(1981); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton County 1973) (whether patient
competent to decide course of medical treatment may be forced to undergo a mastectomy); In re
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (whether persistently vegetative patient may be
removed from respirator). Most of the earlier cases involved a hospital seeking a court order to
give a blood transfusion to a Jehovah's Witness over the patient's or patient's guardian's refusal.
See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied. 331
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp.
752 (D. Conn. 1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Brooks' Estate, 32 II. 361,
205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
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writers argue that the right to refuse medical treatment has ancient
origins. 14 Early cases centered on other issues, such as whether a physician committed an assault or battery when treating a patient without
securing an informed consent'149 or whether a court could order a litigant to undergo a medical examination. 150 But those cases often contained strong dicta suggesting a right to refuse treatment."' Given the

great risk of infection that existed before sterilization and the use of
antibiotics became standard practice, and given the intrusiveness of
even minor surgery without benefit of anesthesia, common law courts
probably would have found such a right had the issue been squarely
presented. Newer technologies may make the refusal of treatment irrational in some cases.185 Nonetheless, the technology explosion of recent
years has resulted in the development of extremely intrusive therapies
and the ability to delay at least briefly the death of a patient suffering
from almost any disease. 15 3 Medical advances, especially in the wide
area where overall benefits are questionable, have met resistance from
various sources, including right-to-die groups,1 54 patients,"J surrogates
(1971). Earlier cases also involve the refusal of parents to allow a transfusion for their child, See,
e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), afT d, 390
U.S. 598 (1968); People ex reL Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952). Finally, there are cases concerning parents who refused to consent to
other medical treatment for their children. See cases cited supra note 129.
148. CONCERN FOR DYING, A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE LIVING WILL 4 (1979): "Federal and
state courts generally have viewed the right to self-determination as encompasssing [sic] the right
of a competent patient to refuse treatment in most cases, even when such refusal appears fool.
hardy, reckless, or irrational."
149. See, e.g., Pratt v. David, 118 Ill.
App. 161 (1905), affid, 224 I11.
300, 79 N.E. 562
(1906); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 516, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Schloendorff v,Society of New
York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
150. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
151. See, e.g., id.at 251 ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.").
152. See, e.g.. In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton County 1973).
153. Commission Report, supra note 21, at 1.
154.

One such group has distributed millions of living wills. CONCERN FOR DYING, QUES-

& ANSWERS ABOUT THE LIVING WILL (1984) (pamphlet distributed by Concern For Dying, New York, N.Y.).
155. See, e.g., the Bouvia case, in which a 26-year-old cerebral palsy victim attempted to get a
court to order the hospital to cease feeding her by force, while providing her with painkilling drugs
and hygienic care. Reported at CONCERN FOR DYING NEWSLETrER, Winter, 1984, at 3. See also
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), a4'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980);
In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116
Misc. 2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
TIONS
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for incompetents, 58 and legislators.1 5 ' There is an enormous body of
literature on the subject, most of it recent, and much of it in praise of

the right to die. 58
Although cases on point are relatively few, 59 some principles have
emerged. The courts have almost universally recognized the right of a

competent patient to refuse medical treatment.1 60 Ironically, the semi156. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); In re
Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
157. As of 1983, thirteen states and the District of Columbia had enacted natural death acts.
See Commission Report, supra note 21, at Appendix D, 318-87. Since that time, eight states have
passed natural death acts: Florida, 1984 Fla. Laws 84:58; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN., §§ 31-32-1 to
-12 (1984); Louisiana, 1984 La. Acts 382 (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1.58.10); Mississippi, 1984 Miss. Laws 365; Virginia, VA. CODE § 54-325:8.1 to 8.13 (1984); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1984); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01 to .15
(West Supp. 1984); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-144 to -151 (1984).
A natural death act provides for recognition of a patient's right to refuse certain medical
treatment and for procedures to be followed in such cases. See generally Comment, The Right to
Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 Tax. TECH L. REV. 99 (1982).
158. See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 21; T. BEAUCHIAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1983); J. CHILDRESS, WHIO StOULD DECIDE? (1982); P.
RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE (1978); J. ROBERTSON, supra note 23; R. STINSON & P.
STINSON, THE LONG DYING OF BABY ANDREW (1983); R. VEATCHI, DEATHI,DYING AND THE
BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION (1976); LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND
TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982); Annas, supra note 54, at 25;

Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Makingfor the Terminally IIl Incompetent.
4 AM. J. L. & MED. 367 (1979); Annas, Nonfeeding: Lawful Killing In CA. Homicide In NJ.
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1983, at 19; Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and ProceduralProtectionsfor Medical Decision Making Within the American Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1983); Battin, The Least Worst Death. HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Apr. 1983, at 13; Brant, supra note 136; Cantor, Quinlan,Privacy, and the Handlingof Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1977); Delgado, EuthanasiaReconsidered-The
Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy. 17 ARIz. L REV. 474 (1975); Fost, supra
note 100, at 5; Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water? HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 17; Paris, Compulsory Afedical Treatment and Religious Freedom
Whose Law Shall Prevail?, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1975); Robertson, supra note 45; Robertson,
supra note 136; Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39; Smith, supra note 26; Strong, Defective Infants
and Their Impact on Families: Ethical and Legal Considerations, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTHI
CARE 168 (1983); Y. Kamisar, A Life Not (Or No Longer) Worth Living: Are We Deciding the
Issue Without Facing It? (Nov. 10, 1977) (Mitchell Lecture delivered at the State University of
New York at Buffalo).
159. See supra cases cited in note 147.
160. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afd. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376
N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied. 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In :e Lydia
E. Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.
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nal case involved the right of an incompetent patient to be withdrawn
from a respirator. In In re Quinlan,16' the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that the right of a competent patient to refuse treatment is a
part of a constitutional right of privacy. The court then held that principles of equality dictated that the comatose patient retained her right
to be withdrawn from treatment. 162 Since Quinlan, courts explicitly
have found a constitutional right of a competent patient to refuse treatment. 163 As with other privacy rights, including the right to an abortion, the state may override the exercise of this right upon a showing of
a compelling state interest. 64 Such instances, however, have been
165
infrequent.
Courts have frequently followed Quinlan's lead in extending the
right to refuse treatment to incompetents without regard to the source
of incompetence.166 Commonly, the patient, like Karen Ann Quinlan,
was once competent, but is now in a persistently vegetative state.161
Others may be incompetent because of retardation, 168 senility, 60 or
mental illness.17 0 Quinlan created some controversy, largely for its
619 (C.P. Northampton County 1973); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P,2d 738 (1983). But
see Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979).
161. 70 N.J. 10, at 38-41, 355 A.2d 647, at 661-64.
162. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
163. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), ajfd, 379 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978).
164. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state's interest in protecting the potentiality of human life allows regulation and prohibition of abortion in third trimester).
165. See, e.g., Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979)
(interest in prison discipline sufficient to override recalcitrant prisoner's refusal to submit to
hemodialysis) (criticized as anomalous in Brant, supra note 136, at 346). But see Zant v.
Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982) (court refused to order forced feeding of prisoner
on a hunger strike).
166. Only the New York Court of Appeals has not followed Quinlan's constitutional holding;
instead, that court found a common law right to refuse medical treatment. In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
167. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983);
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Leach v. Akron Gen.
Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (C.P. 1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
660 P.2d 738 (1983).
168. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belehertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977).
169. See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
170. Department of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (patient was found incompetent to decide whether to submit to surgery; thus her refusal to consent
could be overridden if treatment was in her best interest).
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holding that routine judicial proceedings are not required in such cases
from treatment was apif the decision to withdraw the incompetent
17 1
proved by a hospital ethics committee.
A patient obviously is not compelled to exercise her constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment. It is fairly clear whether or not a
competent patient chooses to exercise that right, subject to some uncertainty as to whether the person really wants treatment to be stopped or
is seeking assurances from family members that her life has not become burdensome. 17 2 The problem is far more difficult with
incompetents.
In Quinlan, the court recognized the problem that an "affirmation
of Karen's independent right of choice

. . .

would ordinarily be based

upon her competency to assert it."173 The court reasoned:
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if
Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which she
would soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the
life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural
death. 17"
Consistent with its analysis that it was the incompetent's choice to exercise her personal right, the court borrowed the substituted judgment
test from the law governing gifts from an incompetent's estate and organ donations by incompetents: "The only practical way to prevent destruction of [her] right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen
to render their best judgment" as to whether she would choose to cease
treatment.17 5 This standard assumes that there is a surrogate in a posi171. See, e.g., Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz, supra note 158, at 378-82; Baron,
supranote 158, at 14-15; Relman, The Saikewicz Decision:Judges as Physicians,298 NEw F-,G.
J. MED. 508 (1978).

172. See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 47:
Helping to shape the deliberations of a patient who must decide about the course and
duration of his or her life is a complex and weighty obligation. For example, letting a
patient know that his or her death is now seen by others to be appropriate--or at least

not unexpected-may be "giving permission to die" to a patient who no longer wishes to
struggle against overwhelming odds. On the other hand, it may encourage overly rapid
acceptance of death by a patient who feels rejected and unimportant.
173.

70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.

174. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
175.

Id. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664.
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tion to substitute his judgment for the patient's in a meaningful way.' 70
In some cases, it has been quite clear that the patient would have
chosen to exercise her right to refuse treatment. For example, Brother
Fox, the comatose patient in In re Storar,17 had discussions about the
Quinlan case with members of his religious order shortly prior to his
own surgery and had expressed views that were consistent with the
Catholic position on terminating treatment. 178 Similarly, in Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Center,17 9 the patient was a member of the Delaware euthanasia society and had communicated her views on life-support systems to her family. It has become increasingly common for people to evidence their desires as to extraordinary medical treatment by
executing a living will.' 80 Surprisingly, living wills have been virtually
untested in the courts. 1 ' They may be ambiguous and require interpretation, but certainly in recurring situations, such as the use of a respirator on a comatose patient, a living will is good evidence of the patient's wishes.
At least where the incompetent patient's views can be ascertained,
it is not surprising that courts have adopted the substituted judgment
test. Commentators on biomedical ethics have concluded that morality
dictates that society honor a patient's refusal to accept treatment. 182
For medical personnel or a court to violate a person's autonomy may be
176.
177.

178.

See infra text accompanying notes 186-201.
52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
For a statement of the Catholic position, see SACRED CONGREGATION FOR T1lE1Doc-

(May 5, 1980), reprinted in Commission
Report, supra note 21, at 300-07. At least since the 1950's, the Church has maintained that it is
"not mortally sinful to use 'extraordinary' treatment for a terminal patient. However, neither is it
required since such a patient need be given only 'ordinary' treatment." See Eichner v. Dillon, 73

TRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA

A.D.2d 431, 439 n.3, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 n.3 (1980) (discussing Pope Pius XII's November
24, 1957, allocutio to a group of anesthesiologists).
179. 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).

180. See CONCERN FOR DYING, supra note 154. In addition, undoubtedly many peoplo have
executed such documents now that almost half of the states have legislatively recognized them,
See supra note 157. See also The 'Living Will' Gains Acceptance, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at
C9, col. 3.

181.

See J.

ROBERTSON,

supra note 23, at 99-100. Cf. John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth,

452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
182. For example, in his influential article Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, Professor Robertson, while arguing in favor of vigorous treatment for

seriously ill newborns, recognizes that
[t]he notion that a person is an autonomous being with inherent dignity and value and
whose life and actions are-to the greatest extent compatible with the rights of
others-to be controlled by his own choices, has been a dominant theme in the philosophy
and politics of Western civilization since the Enlightenment.
Robertson, supra note 136, at 48 n.2.
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to treat the person as a means, which is condemned almost universally
as immoral. 183 Limited intervention against a person's will may be justified, as in suicide prevention.184 Such instances are limited, however,
distinguish between suicide and the refusal of
and most commentators
1 85
treatment.
medical
Where the incompetent patient's wishes are not known, courts may
strain to apply the substituted judgment test. In a 1977 lecture, Professor Kamisar took the New Jersey Supreme Court to task for its application of the substituted judgment test in the Quinlan case."" At trial,
friends and relatives testified concerning statements made by Karen evidencing her views on the use of life-support systems. Both the trial
court and the supreme court found those statements "so informal, impersonal, abstract and equivocal as to lack the requisite probative
value." 1817 The supreme court remanded the case and ordered that
Karen's father be allowed to have the respirator withdrawn if that decision was found to be consistent with Karen's views. According to
Kamisar, the court thus narrowed the gap between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. 88
Absent evidence of Karen's views, the court relied on a presumption that the decision of the guardian and family to withdraw a comatose patient from the respirator "should be accepted by a society the
overwhelming majority of whose members would, we think, in similar
circumstances, exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves
or for those closest to them."189 Kamisar argues that the court lacked
factual support for its conclusions, and that even if supported by data,
183. See. e.g., T. BEAUCHANIP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 158. "To violate a person's autonomy is to treat that person merely as a means, because he or she is treated in accordance with

rules not of his or her choosing." Id. at 62. "Diverse figures in philosophy, ranging from Kant,
Mill, Nietzsche, and Sartre to Robert Paul Wolff, have held that morality requires autonomous
persons." Id. at 59.
184. J. CHILDRESS, supra note 158, at 164.

185.

See id. at 157-81. See also Commission Report, supra note 21, at 37-39.

186.

Y. Kamisar, supra note 158.

187. Id. at 5.
188.

Presumably the guardian and family of Karen had presented to the court ever)'thlng
they knew bearing on Karen's supposed choice. But the court concluded that what evidence was submitted was insufficient, that her previous conversations with friends were

"without sufficient probative weight." How, then, can the guardian and the family discern Karen's choice on the basis of the the same remote and impersonalprevious conversations both Quinlan courts found inconclusive?
Id. at 6-7.
189.

In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
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the desire of a majority of people should not control the treatment of
an individual patient.190
Professor Kamisar is an effective critic of those seeking to make
death too easy.' 9' But there may be a kinder understanding of the
Quinlan case. Kamisar's assertion that the guardian and family "had
presented to the court everything they knew bearing on Karen's supposed choice" is misleading. They no doubt presented all statements
that she had made concerning life support systems, but that is quite
different from whether Karen's parents knew her values and goals. One
can imagine, for example, a husband, who has never discussed the use
of a respirator with his wife but who may nonetheless be aware of her
values and be able to infer from them whether she would choose to be
sustained indefinitely on a respirator. She may have shunned medical
treatment, disliked hospitals, had an aversion to unnecessary financial
expenditures, been unsentimental about death, expressed hope that her
husband not grieve unduly if she predeceased him, or provided for her
organs to be donated upon her death. A surrogate decisionmaker might
consider all of those stances in substituting his judgment for that of the
comatose patient because they do bear on the patient's actual preference. Consideration of such factors is more than what rules of evidence
might term reliance on presumptions or surmises.
Apart from whether Quinlan can withstand critical
analysis,
Kamisar's criticism points to a weakness in the substituted judgment
test. In some cases, there simply will be no basis of any kind on which
to conclude how the patient would decide for herself. A simple hypothetical underscores the point: a patient is brought to a hospital emergency room; he is comatose, has no identification and no family or
friends come forward to identify him.192 How might a surrogate substi190.
Even if only a very few patients in Karen's set of circumstances were determined to

struggle on, that they are in the distinct minority is no justification for denying them
their personal right to struggle on. After all, comatose patients are not fungibles. Even if
we accept the unexamined and undocumented assumption of the New Jersey Supreme
Court that a majority of those in Karen's situation would choose to die, this silent majority cannot speak for all those in such situations.
Y. Kamisar, supra note 158, at 13.
191. See also Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958).
192. Patients for whom there is no adequate surrogate are apparently quite numerous:

[T]he undeniable tragic fact of the matter is that many, many people, into the thousands,
do not have a brother or sister, a mother, a parent, a daughter, or son who can be ap.

pointed guardian. There isn't anybody. A lot of them are in institutions, and with the
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tute her judgment for that of the comatose patient?
Harder still is the use of the substituted judgment test in cases like
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz. 3a There the
patient was "sixty-seven years old, with an I.Q. of ten and a mental age
of approximately two years and eight months. He was profoundly mentally retarded. ' 194 Saikewicz was suffering from leukemia, and the
court was faced with a decision whether to order chemotherapy for
him. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that principles
of equality dictated that the right to refuse medical treatment be extended to incompetent patients, as exercised by a surrogate.19 5 Although its decision is not without ambiguity, the court held that the
surrogate should employ the substituted judgment standard even in a
case like Saikewicz's.196
Substituted judgment is difficult to understand in such a case. The
standard "requires that a surrogate attempt to reach the decision that
the incapacitated person would make if he or she were able to
choose." 9 ' It is more flexible than the competing best interest standard
because substituted judgment allows the decisionmaker to consider the
idiosyncrasies of the incompetent patient' 98 and is, therefore, more obviously consonant with the concept that refusal of medical treatment is
the exercise of a personal constitutional right. 199 But it is illogical to
deinstitutionalization process, a lot are now in the community. And there isn't a person to
appoint. And we have run out of volunteers.
Testimony of Paul Rogers to the President's Commission, quoted in Commission Report, supra
note 21, at 130.
193. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
194. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
195. "The recognition of that right must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a
competent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to both." Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d
at 427.
196. Elsewhere, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged that the substiinvolving a
tuted judgment test amounts to the best interest test in such cases: "In a case ...
child who is incompetent by reason of his tender years, we think that the substituted judgment
doctrine is consistent with the 'best interest of the child' test." Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass.
697, 710 n.10, 434 N.E.2d 601, 608 n.10 (1982). See also Guthiel & Appelbaum. Substituted
Judgment: Best Interests in Disguise. HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1983. at 8.
197. Commission Report, supra note 21, at 132.
198. Id. at 132-33. See also Robertson, supra note 136, at 62-63 (The substituted judgment
test is grounded on the doctrine of respect for persons, which holds that "people are free to make
choices according to their own conception of their interests. This freedom generally prevails even
if we disagree with the person's choice of ends or means. .. ").
199. See, e.g.. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 ("Our affirmation of Karen's
independent right of choice, however, would ordinarily be based upon her competency to assert
it. . . . [W]e have concluded that Karen's right of privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her
guardian under the peculiar circumstances here present."). Arguably, a court would have to con-
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talk about whether Joseph Saikewicz would choose chemotherapy if he
were able to do so, unless the court is simply assuming that he would
choose whatever treatment was in his best interest. A surrogate substituting her judgment for the incompetent must do so by reference to
goals and values that a severely retarded patient cannot form in any
meaningful sense. In concluding that Saikewicz need not receive chemotherapy, the court never satisfactorily responded to this point. It relied
on the patient's disorientation, a continuing state of pain, adverse side
effects, and an inability to cooperate with treatment as evidence of how
Saikewicz would exercise his judgment.200 But even if all of those factors were present, it is inconceivable that the court would have ruled
20 1
the same way if the treatment clearly had been in his best interest.
The substituted judgment test is even harder to apply in a treatment decision on behalf of a seriously ill newborn. Nonetheless, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has insisted that surrogates apply the substituted judgment test in such cases. The court is surprisingly frank, however, that application of the test in such cases is a
fiction:
In a case. . . involving a child who is incompetent by reason
of his tender years . . . the substituted judgment doctrine is

consistent with the best interests of the child test. It is true
that, when applying the best interest test, the inquiry is essentially objective in nature, and the decisions are made not by,
but on behalf of, the child. .

.

. Nevertheless, the best inter-

ests analysis, like that of the substituted judgment doctrine,
requires a court to focus on the various factors unique to the
situation of the individual for whom it must act. .

.

. As a

practical matter, the criteria to be examined and the basic applicable reasoning are the same.20 2
The court's insistence that the best interest test be clothed in substituted judgment language can best be understood as a way to make
front the difficult question of whether it was sanctioning involuntary euthanasia if it did not have
recourse to the substituted judgment test. See Kamisar, supra note 158.

200. Superintendent of Belchertown School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 753-54, 370 N.E.2d at
432.
201. For example, the Pasteur treatment for rabies may cause similar pain and disorientation
to a severely retarded patient. It is inconceivable that a court would allow the patient, bitten by a

rabid animal, to die without ordering treatment. Elsewhere the court explicitly stated that the
substituted judgment test may amount to the best interest test for incompetents. Custody of a
Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 710 n.10, 434 N.E.2d 601, 608 n.10 (1982).
202. Id. (citing Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978)).
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surrogate decisions for infants consistent with the constitutional underpinnings of the right to refuse treatment. As indicated above, the right
is a personal one that a patient may choose not to exercise.203 It makes
sense that the appropriate standard attempts to ensure that the patient's choice is honored. Relying on the substituted judgment test circumvents a need to decide whether, even if acting in the infant's best
interest, withdrawal from treatment is in reality a form of involuntary
euthanasia. o4
It is important to consider how a state court might decide a case
like Baby Jane Doe, consistent with the emerging principles governing
denial of treatment. Several arguments are advanced by proponents of
vigorous treatment for seriously ill newborns that failure to treat an
infant like Baby Jane Doe constitutes, at a minimum, neglect, and
quite probably, homicide, if her death results from the parents' and
physician's omission. 5 They also argue that,206apart from the law, treatment ought to be provided for such infants.
Initially conceding that not all seriously ill newborns must be
treated, Professor Robertson recognizes the principle that permits withdrawal of treatment only if, on balance, treatment provides no reasonable hope of benefit to the newborn. To the proponents of vigorous
treatment, this principle does not justify denial of treatment in a case
like Infant Doe's or Baby Jane Doe's:
When the procedure entails great expense or inconvenience to
the family, or pain to the infant, there is lack of reasonable
hope of benefit only if life itself is not deemed a benefit to the
child.
The case of lifesaving treatment for the defective infant is
thus distinguished from the cases of terminal illness where resuscitation, surgery, or medication, although possibly prolonging life, are considered extraordinary procedures. .

. Thus,

treatment merely prolongs dying. The defective infant, on the
other hand, if treated, can normally live for significant periods. Unless the quality of life affects its value, a judgment for
which there is no legal precedent, the likelihood that treat203. See supra text accompanying note 199.
204. See Kamisar, supra note 158.
205. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 45, at 217-35; Robertson, Legal Aspects of Withholding
Medical Treatmentfrom HandicappedChildren, in LEGAL AND ETHiCAL ASPECTS OF TREATING
CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS, supra note 158; Smith, supra note 26.
206. See Reagan, supra note 3, at 10, 11; Robertson, supra note 45, at 216, 251-62.
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ment means life should justify the procedure. 0 7

Thus, an omission is culpable only if there is a duty to act,208 and the
line between that duty and its absence is determined by the net benefit
to the infant. Robertson and others argue, however, that the law is
well-settled that quality of life may not be considered in measuring the
relative benefits and burdens. Instead, one must ask whether treatment
merely prolongs dying, in which case no duty would exist, or whether

treatment will sustain life for a significant period of time, in which case
a duty would exist.
A balancing test is almost necessarily imprecise. The weight to be
given to various factors will allow varied results. For example, Professor Robertson recognizes that "life is not in a patient's interests when it
is so full of suffering or so devoid of meaning that the burdens of the
medical care necessary to keep him or her alive do not seem worth
it."2 0 He rejects, however, the notion that children inflicted with spina
bifida fall into that category.21 0
I.,,

207. Robertson, supra note 45, at 236-37 (emphasis added). See also Smith, supra note 26, at
1143 ("To suggest that the state interest in preserving life is somehow reduced by a defect would
be to alter seriously the traditional legal view of the value of human life."). In support of his
statement that there is no legal precedent for quality of life decisions, Professor Robertson cites
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (actions for wrongful life and wrongful
birth disallowed). Since that time, serious inroads have been made. Subsequently, the New Jersey
Supreme Court overruled Gleitman insofar as the case disallowed the parents' action for wrongful
birth. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). That cause of action has been adopted by
numerous courts. See G. CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 773 n.4
(1983). See also Comment, 'Wrongful Life. The Right Not to be Born, 54 TUL. L. REv. 480
(1980). An infant's action for wrongful life was allowed in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,
106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). See also Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982) (allowing a limited right of recovery); Speck v. Finegold, 497
Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (denial of child's right of action affirmed by equally divided court).
208. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (1972); PROSSEiR AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 121, at § 56.
209. Robertson, Legal Aspects of Withholding Medical Treatment from Handicapped C/ildren, supra note 205, at 222.
210.
These infants may suffer from repeated medical interventions, and may nbt have access
to the full range of opportunities available to nondisabled persons. But the perspective of
the healthy, normal individual is the wrong perspective to take. The view of ordinary
people who know ordinary capacities for experience and interaction, and who may view
the infant's existence as a fate worse than death, does not tell us how the infant who has
no other life experience views it. For that child life in a severely disabled form would
seem better than no life at all, even if it is lived in the custodial wards of a state
institution.
Id. at 223-24. Elsewhere Professor Robertson explicates his reasons for believing that life in al.
most any form is better than no life at all:
One who has never known the pleasures of mental operation, ambulation, and social in-
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Robertson also rejects as irrelevant the devastating impact that
such a seriously ill newborn may have on a family, health care professionals, or society at large."' 1
Most advocates of aggressive treatment for seriously ill newborns
concede that there are some cases in which treatment hardly seems
worthwhile. For Robertson, those cases are few indeed. His response to
the infant in unbearable pain is that pain can be made bearable with
analgesics.2 12 Even where the prognosis is grim, he argues that the
margin of error at birth is too great to allow parents to deny treatment
to the infant.213 Finally, in those limited cases where denial of treatment is morally justified, allowing the parents to refuse consent, in efteraction surely does not suffer from their loss as much as one who has. While one who
without them, we have no assurance
has known these capacities may prefer death to life
that the handicapped person, with no point of comparison, would agree. Life, and life
alone, whatever its limitations, might be of sufficient worth to him.
Robertson, supra note 45, at 254.
211. Robertson, supra note 45, at 255-61. This article considers the extent to which the quality of life is relevant to deciding the best interest of an infant without reference to the benefit of
others. Interestingly, though, in the context of organ donations, incompetents have been allowed to
donate organs to benefit family members when the operation and donation in fact create medical
risks for the incompetents. See. e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). One justification is that respect for a person's autonomy requires that he be permitted to act altruistically.
Robertson, supra note 136, at 49, 73. Professor Robertson rejects application of that principle in
cases involving seriously ill newborns: "[The substituted judgment] doctrine is unlikely to support
decisions in favor of passive euthanasia of defective newborns. . . ." Id. at 77. It is not clear why
in a case of an infant with a severely limited cognitive existence a decisionmaker must deem
entirely irrelevant suffering imposed on third parties. It is certainly not immoral for conscious
patients to consider the impact of their illness and continued treatment on third parties. See, e.g.,
SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARTION OF EtmIANASIA (May

5, 1980), reprinted in Commission Report, supra note 21, at 300, 306, which states:
It is also permitted, with the patient's consent, to interrupt these means, where the results
fall short of expectations. But for such a decision to be made, account will have to be
taken of the reasonable wishes of the patient and the patient's family, and also of the
advice of the doctors who are specially competent in the matter. The latter may in particular judge that the investment in instruments and personnel is disproportionate the [sic]
the results foreseen ...
That third party concerns should not be controlling does not render them irrelevant.
212. Robertson, supra note 45, at 253. Recourse to painkilling drugs is not necessarily the
panacea that Professor Robertson suggests. Some conditions may be painful despite the use of
painkilling drugs that leave the marginally conscious patient even less aware of her environment.
See Battin, supra note 158, at 14. Further, effective pain management may require increasing
drug dosages, which in turn increases the risk of the patient's death. See Commission Report,
supra note 21, at 77-82.
213. Robertson, supra note 45, at 255. If the dispute is about the degree of accuracy of medical prognosis, the dispute is factual, not moral, and the solution might be improved prognostic
techniques. Cf. Lorber, Early Results of Selective Treatment of Spina Bifida Cystica, 4 BRt.
MED. J. 201 (1973). The current debate suggests, however, that the dispute is primarily a moral
one. See, e.g., Reagan, supra note 3.
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fect, places society on the slippery slope of judging the quality of life.214
As indicated above, advocates of aggressive treatment contend that
precedent clearly establishes a duty to treat an infant faced with a lifethreatening illness. There is, for example, a long line of cases involving
parents who denied children medical treatment based on the parents'
religious convictions.2 15 Courts typically have ordered blood transfusions for children of Jehovah's Witnesses, even if the court would allow
the parents to refuse similar treatment for themselves. 218 Parents have
been found criminally liable even when they interposed a defense of
ignorance and poverty. 217 At the same time, courts have recognized
that parental discretion in family matters is part of a federally guaranteed right to privacy. 21a As a result, courts have honored parental refusal to consent to treatment in some cases. Despite the frequent assertions that the law clearly requires treatment in cases like Baby Jane
Doe's,219 that is far from true. The absence of criminal prosecutions of
parents and doctors for denying treatment to seriously ill newborns is
evidence that the law is not as well settled as advocates for aggressive
treatment allege.220 The black letter principle may be clear that parents
and physicians owe a duty to provide beneficial or ordinary treatment
to an infant, but 2there is still an active debate on what constitutes ordi2
nary treatment. 1
214. This appears to be another formulation of the "slippery slope" argument, rebutted elsewhere. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
215. See cases cited supra note 147.
216. See cases cited supra note 147. See also Paris, supra note 158.
217. See, e.g., Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676 (1913), affd on rehearing,94 Neb.
151, 142 N.W. 670 (1913).

218. See cases cited supra note 128.
219. See, e.g., J. ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 90; Robertson, supra note 45, at 243; Smith,
supra note 26, at 1143.

220.

Professor Robertson contends that a clear basis for prosecution exists. He considers sev-

eral explanations for why no parents have been prosecuted for withholding care for seriously ill

newborns. Robertson, supra note 45, at 243-44. One obvious explanation would seem to be the low
visibility of the practice. But given the current interest by strangers in the Baby Jane Doe case,
either there will be more prosecutions in such cases or we must look for other explanations, One
explanation rejected by Professor Robertson is that the law simply is not settled. State appellate

courts have not defined the duty owed to seriously ill newborns. See discussion infra notes 222-40
and accompanying text.

One interesting aside-Professor Robertson gave an accurate prognostication in his 1975 article: "Although the right-to-life groups have focused on abortion and not yet entered this area,
they may rechannel their efforts in the future, particularly as they suffer defeat on the abortion
issue." Robertson, supra note 45, at 244. The Baby Jane Doe and University Hospital cases prove
this point. See also AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 26.

221.

See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 21, at 82-89.
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Furthermore, the line between parental privacy rights and the
duty to provide treatment wavers, 22 and courts have drawn the line
between corrective and lifesaving treatment.223 Elsewhere, parental refusal has been upheld where224
the benefits of the surgery might arguably
be outweighed by the risks.
Professor Robertson has argued that the law is settled in cases involving infants at risk with spina bifida. His premises are that treatment is required in life-threatening situations and that, untreated, myelomeningocele, a form of spina bifida, will become life-threatening;
therefore, surgery must be provided. 2 5 In virtually every case cited by
Robertson, corrective surgery and treatment held the possibility of a
cure for the underlying malady, and the child had the chance to live a
normal existence. 226 Those decisions do not compel surgery in an extreme case like Baby Jane Doe because neither condition is met.
Until recently, treatment was not available in cases like Baby Jane
Doe. Neonatal intensive care units did not exist until the 1960's,227 and

surgical procedures to correct many pediatric anomalies are also recent
developments.228 It would be irrational to suggest that technological
growth be stymied; it is similarly unreasonable, however, to accept uncritically the law developed in cases that predate these developments.
One also must examine the precedential value of those cases that,
advocates of aggressive treatment argue, mandate treatment for seriously ill newborns with severe anomalies.2 29 The citations are merely
222.

Compare In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (court refused to order

corrective surgery over the objections of a 14-year-old boy with a cleft palate and a harclip), with
In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (court remanded case to determine whether 16year-old consented to blood transfusions necessary to perform surgery to correct a severe curva-

ture of his spine). See also In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (court may not
order surgery over parent's objections if parent has legal custody).

223. See In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
224. See In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1911).
225. See J. ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 85-88.
226. The obvious cases are those involving blood transfusions. See cases cited supra note 147.
See also In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (Fain. Ct. 1970) (court

ordered surgery to repair enormous facial deformity which, untreated, "must inevitably exert a
most negative effect upon his personality development, his opportunity for education and later
employment and upon every phase of his relationship with peers and others"), affd, 37 A.D.2d
668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), affd. 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972);

In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (court remanded to determine whether 16-yearold boy consented to blood transfusions during surgery that would correct his physical

impairment).
227.
228.
229.

See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 203.
Id. at 197.
J. ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 86-88; Smith supra note 26.
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trial court decisions.130 Although at least one appellate court decision
has clearly entrusted the treatment decision to the parents, 31 the protreatment camp has dismissed this out of hand. 232 Further, even the
frequently cited Application of Cicero does not necessarily support a
broad requirement of treatment in cases like Baby Jane Doe. In Cicero,
the infant's prognosis indicated normal intellectual development and
ambulation with braces.2 33 An assertion that such precedent mandates
aggressive treatment in all spina bifida cases ignores the Baby Jane
Doe decision by the appellate division and the court of appeals. The
appellate division did, after all, uphold a parental decision to refuse
fully aggressive treatment, at least where a claim was made that some
alternative therapy was provided; 23 4 the court of appeal decision balanced family privacy interests and those of the seriously ill newborn
parental discretion to control absent clear benefit to the
and allowed
35
newborn.
In the absence of settled precedent, the issue is whether a court
should compel treatment in a case like Baby Jane Doe. Advocates of
aggressive treatment frequently assert that courts do not and should
not consider quality of life in deciding whether treatment should be
provided.236 While courts have stated that quality of life is irrelevant to
whether treatment should be compelled, closer scrutiny reveals that
courts and commentators clearly do consider quality of life to be
relevant.
The Quinlan case is illustrative. It was assumed at trial that
Karen was being kept alive by a respirator and would continue to be
230.

Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Sup. Ct. Civ. Action No. 74-145 (Cumberland County,

Me. 1974); In
re Cicero, 101
231. In re
949 (1980).
232. "The

re Kerri Ann MeNulty, No. 1960 (P. Ct. Essex County, Mass. Feb. 15, 1978); In
Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
Becker decision is poorly reasoned, and is unlikely to be followed by other courts

that consider the issue. (Indeed, it has binding effect only within the fourth appellate district of
California-the San Jose Area.)" J. RoBERTSON, supra note 23, at 89. Becker may in fact be
indefensible. But see Annas, supra note 54. The latter criticism, however, that Becker lacks precce
dential value, is even truer of the trial court decisions relied on to assert that treatment is required
in cases like Baby Jane Doe.
233. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
234. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, affd, 60 N.Y.2d 208,
456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983).
235. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983). See also Commission Report, supra note 21, at 217-23, which
advocates that in ambiguous cases, the parents' decision be honored.
236. Robertson, supra note 45, at 237; Smith, supra note 26, at 1161-65.
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kept alive almost indefinitely. 3 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court believed that most would agree that such a life was not worth living and
that Karen's guardian could reasonably conclude that she would feel
similarly.2 38 Every court9 and virtually every commentator considering
23
that issue has agreed.

By direct analogy, infants suffering from painful and life-threatening anomalies can be kept alive by extraordinary treatment. Even Sur-

geon General Koop agrees that some infants-those suffering from either anencephaly or intracranial bleeding, and those born without an
intestine-may be denied treatment. Koop contends that treatment for
those infants is not compelled under section
504 despite the possibility
240
of prolonged existence with treatment.

Advocates of aggressive treatment concede that those cases are exceptions to the rule of treatment. But they also contend that the quality

of life is not involved in drawing the line.24 One commentator suggests
that the persistently vegetative patient, such as an anencephalic, does

not have a low quality of life, but instead has no life at all. 242 At best,
that is a semantic distinction. It was conceded that Karen Ann Quinlan
was alive at the time of trial, 243 and she remains alive even without the
assistance of a respirator. 4 No legislature or court has held that a
237. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 19, 25, 355 A.2d at 652, 655.
238. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
239. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 147; J. CHILDRtESS, supra note 158, at 172-75; Cantor,
supra note 158. But see Y. Kamisar, supra note 158. While Professor Kamisar is critical of the
court's reasoning, he suggests that the same result might have been reached by a different rationale. Id. at 32.
240. Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39, at 18-19, quoting Surgeon General Koop's testimony
before Judge Gesell in American Academy of Pediatrics.For example, despite being able to maintain an infant born without an intestine for up to eighteen months, Koop contended that treatment
would not be required in such a case. As observed by Singer & Kuhse, "lwlhy does Dr. Koop not
think such infants should be kept alive as long as possible? Would he not think an eighteen-month
extension of life worthwhile for a normal child? Would he not think it worthwhile for a normal
adult? If he would, the obvious explanation for his different view in the first case is that he does
not regard the life of an artificially nourished infant as being of the same worth as that of a
normal infant or a normal adult." Id. at 18. One commentator, ordinarily an advocate of treating
seriously ill newborns, cf. Robertson & Fost, Passive Euthanasia of Defective Newborn Infants:
Legal Considerations,88 J. PEDIATRIcs 883 (1976), has criticized HHS's regulation as unintelligible because of such inconsistencies. Fost, supra note 158.
241. Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39, at 19-20. See also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap Relating to Health Care for HandicappedInfants, supra note 14.
242. Smith, supra note 26, at 1162-63.
243. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 20, 25, 355 A.2d at 652, 654.
244. Karen Ann Quinlan is still alive despite having been weaned from the respirator. The
'Living Will' Gains Acceptance, supra note 180, at col. 4. That such a patient is alive is clear from
her bodily functions:
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persistently comatose patient is dead, even when adopting a brain death
standard.24
Others have relied on different semantic distinctions. HHS, for example, has insisted that treatment decisions are discriminatory if influenced by subjective quality of life judgments, but that nontreatment is
permissible if "medically indicated." In turn, HHS considers treatment
futile or medically contraindicated if it will "merely temporarily prolong the process of dying, ' ' 46 as opposed to curing the underlying malady. Professor Robertson advances the same distinction. 47
There are at least two analytical problems with those distinctions.
First, it is hard to understand why a duty to treat should turn on the
length of time that treatment prolongs life, unless factors like cost of
treatment or quality of life are in fact being considered. Second, reliance on "terminal illness" does not explain the examples advanced by
advocates of aggressive treatment in which they deem nontreatment acceptable. Closer scrutiny suggests that quality of life has influenced
their judgment.
If one has recourse only to black-letter principles, any shortening
of life constitutes homicide. 48 One commits homicide whether one
shoots a person in the prime of life, a dying cancer patient, a passenger
as he boards the Titanic or a skier about to be crushed in an avaApplication of noxious stimuli to the nerve endings of an unconscious patient leads to
simple, unregulated reflex responses at both the spinal and the brain stem levels. Reflexes
may allow some eye movement, grimacing, swallowing, and pupillary adjustment to light.
If the reticular activating system in the brain stem is intact, the eyes can open and close
in regular daily cycles.
Commission Report, supra note 21, at 175.
245. See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 9-10 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
DEFINING DEATH:

A

REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES ON THE DETERMINA-

(1981)) concerning the problem of defining when death occurs.
246. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants, supra note 14, at 30,846-47. H.R. 1904 requires that patients be provided with "medically indicated" treatment and seemingly would be subject to the same criticisms as the standard
adopted by HHS.
247.
The terminally ill patient will soon die, with or without the procedure. Thus, treatment
merely prolongs dying. The defective infant, on the other hand, if treated, can normally
live for significant periods. Unless the quality of his life affects its value, a judgment for
which there is no legal precedent, the likelihood that treatment means life should justify
the procedure. But, where the medical procedure has no reasonable prospect, given the
state of the art, of substantially prolonging the child's life, the procedure may be extraordinary and thus not required.
Robertson, supra note 45, at 237.
248. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 208, at §35.
TION OF DEATH
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lanche.249 Cases dealing with the rights of seriously ill or persistently
vegetative patients force courts to draw finer distinctions. Some courts
have relied on the patient's putative choice;2 50 others have advanced the
argument that denial or refusal of treatment is appropriate if death is
251
imminent.
It is important to ask why life can be abandoned if the prospects
are for a short life; rephrased, one might ask why prolongation for a
short period of time is not worthwhile. One might argue that the
financial cost of prolonging life for such a short time is not worth the
benefit, but the counterargument has been made that cost is an inappropriate basis for deciding to deny treatment to the seriously ill newborn.252 If cost is relevant at all to medical treatment cases, it is unclear why it would not be relevant to the treatment of an infant who
may require expensive treatment during her entire lifetime. Another
explanation might be that it is unfair to prolong third-party suffering
when the benefits to the patient are so limited. Again, third-party suffering has been rejected as entirely irrelevant to the treatment decision
on behalf of a seriously ill newborn.253
What then justifies allowing a patient or her surrogate to choose
death if treatment will merely prolong life for a relatively short period
of time? In the case of sapient patients, we now know that a patient
prepares psychologically to die and it may be unconscionable to interfere with that natural process.254 It is doubtful that the newborn shares
that experience. Furthermore, even an insubstantial period of existence
constitutes life, and if all lives are equal, as asserted by President Reagan and HHS,255 shortness of life span would not seem to be a justification for allowing an infant to die.2 6 There is a hidden premise in the
argument that denial or refusal of treatment is appropriate if death is
imminent. Underlying the distinction is a quality of life judgment: an
249. Id. Cf. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 121, at § 52. See
generally D. MAGUIRE, DEATH BY CHOICE 22-50 (1974).
250. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
251. See, e.g.. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). afd, 379 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980).
252. Robertson, supra note 45, at 252, 258-61.
253. Id.
254. See E. KUBLER-Ross, DEATH AND DYING (1969).
255. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants. supra note 14, at 30,846; Reagan, supra note 3, at 11-12.

256. This is especially true when one realizes that the administration views eighteen months as
an insubstantial period of time. Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39, at 18-19 (citing Surgeon General
Koop's testimony in American Academy of Pediatrics).
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insubstantial life span makes impossible a sapient existence; lacking
that opportunity the life is not worth living.
The second distinction is between merely prolonging life when
treatment is not mandatory, and curing the infant of a life-threatening
illness.2 57 Again advocates of that distinction contend that it avoids
subjective quality of life judgments and is an objective medical evaluation. 2 8 However, it is not immediately clear what "merely prolonging
life" means. One might argue that the distinction requires treatment if
it will cure a life-threatening situation, but not otherwise. Some treatments, however, may never cure an underlying condition, but could be
considered mandatory if they provide time for other curative therapies
to be applied.259
Some hopelessly debilitated patients are capable of being sustained
for substantial periods of time. 60 If the decision to withdraw them
from treatment is medically indicated, it is only because doctors sometimes do make quality of life decisions. Those patients may be withdrawn from life support systems because society believes that a life
without cognitive brain function is not worth living. Advocates of treatment may attempt to distinguish among particular cases, but not without recourse to some consideration of the quality of life. Line drawing
may be easier if difficult quality-of-life decisions can be avoided, but
efforts to do so cannot explain the results that advocates of aggressive
treatment argue for in actual cases.
Cases involving comatose patients are not the only instances in
which courts and commentators have in fact considered quality of life
relevant to whether treatment is appropriate. In Superintendent of
Belchertown School v. Saikewicz,2 61 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, like HHS, asserted that the quality of a severely retarded
patient's life was irrelevant to whether he should be given
chemotherapy. 62
257. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care for
HandicappedInfants, supra note 14, at 30,846-47.
258. Id. at 30,847.
259. Use of a respirator might be required where available to keep a patient breathing after
having suffered, for example, an allergic reaction to a bee or wasp sting, where full recovery might
be expected.
260. See, e.g., Field & Romanus, A DecerebratePatient: Eighteen Years of Care, 45 CONN.
MED. 717 (1981).

261. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
262.
The sixth factor identified by the [trial] judge as weighing against chemotherapy was the
quality of life possible for him even if the treatment does bring about remission. To the
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The court insisted that it was applying the substituted judgment
test, but, as argued above, given Saikewicz's inability to form goals and
values, it was in fact applying a best interest test. 63 Even under the
less flexible best interest standard, Saikewicz's severe retardation

should have been considered, and in fact was considered, relevant to
treatment. The court in Saikewicz found that a majority of competent
patients would choose to undergo chemotherapy if faced with
Saikewicz's diagnosis. 2 His retardation limited his ability to cooperate
in or to understand the need for treatment. Also relevant were the extent of his pain and his ability to understand that pain. The quality of
life Saikewicz faced with treatment, affected as it had to be by his

severe retardation, was highly relevant to whether a court should force
him to submit to treatment.6 5
Biological life is not the only value; respect for the person requires
that he be treated according to his individual needs.260 A refusal to
consider the fact of his retardation would violate his dignity as a
unique person. By direct contrast, under a simplistic analysis that
would make consideration of his handicap irrelevant, Saikewicz would
have been compelled to submit to chemotherapy contrary to his best
interest.
It should not be surprising that quality of life considerations affect
treatment decisions. While not everyone has the same threshold of intolerable suffering, competent adults frequently make treatment deciextent that this formulation equates the value of life with any measure of the quality of
life, we firmly reject it. ...The judge, as well as all the parties, were keenly aware
that the supposed ability ofSaikewicz. by virtue of his mental retardation, to appreciate
or experience life had no place in the decision before then.
Id. at 754, 370 N.E.2d at 432 (emphasis added). The emphasized statement is patently untrue.
Moreover, there is some confusion in the use of the term "quality of life." "Sometimes it refers to
the value that the continuation of life has for the patient, and other times to the value that others
find in the continuation of the patient's life, perhaps in terms of their estimates of the patient's
actual or potential productivity or social contribution." See Commission Report, supra note 21. at
135 n.43. Throughout this article, the term "quality of life" has been used in the first sense only.
263. See supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
264.

373 Mass. at 733-34, 370 N.E.2d at 421.

265. Id. at 754-55, 370 N.E.2d at 432. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053
(1978), offers further evidence that quality of life is relevant to treatment decisions. Chad Green,
a two-year-old, had a chance of a cure only slightly better than Saikewicz's. Chad could understand the need for treatment only slightly better than could Saikewicz; the treatment presumably
would cause him disorientation to about the same degree as it would Saikcwicz. Balanced against
those factors, however, was the prospect of a fully sapient existence for the young child. That
benefit was clearly entitled to a great deal of weight.
266. 373 Mass. at 750-51, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31; see also J. CnLtwRas, supra note 158, at
172-75.
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sions for themselves based on the potential quality of life available after
treatment. Patients faced with surgical removal of gangrenous extremities have resisted treatment because death seemed a better option than
life as a cripple.26 7 Some people are willing to die rather than face the
guilt of violating their religious principles.268 Others have pleaded with
family members to allow them to starve 26 9 or to kill them 270 to avoid
continuing a severely incapacitated existence. Millions of people have
executed living wills in the hope of being spared a vegetative existence.2 71 Ethicists and religious leaders have found many of those decisions to be morally acceptable. 2
The obvious distinction between a competent adult and a seriously
ill newborn is the adult's capacity to choose a course of treatment. Necessarily, the legal basis for making a decision for a seriously ill newb
born is different from that governing decisions of competent adults or
even once-competent adults. 2 7 3 But that does not mean that quality of
life is irrelevant to the application of the best interest standard.
There is increasing recognition that treatment decisions for incompetents should be governed by reference to the proportional benefits
and burdens of the proposed treatment.27 4 As indicated above, most advocates of aggressive treatment concede that there are some extreme
cases where denial of treatment is appropriate. But they resist that op267. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct., P. Div. 1978).

268. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 147, involving Jehovah's Witnesses. See also Paris, supra
note 158.
269. See, e.g., the Bouvia case discussed in CONCERN FOR DYING NEWSLavrER, supra note
155, at 3.
270. See, e.g., D. MAGUIRE, supra note 249, at 23-25.

271.

See

CONCERN FOR

DYING, supra note 154, cited in Commission Report, supra noto 21,

at 139.
272. See D. MAGUIRE. supra note 249.
273. See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 132-36.

274. As summarized by the President's Commission:
If the ordinary/extraordinary distinction is understood in terms of the usefulness and
burdensomeness of a particular therapy, however, the distinction does have moral significance. When a treatment is deemed extraordinary because it is too burdensome for a

particular patient, the individual (or a surrogate) may appropriately decide not to undertake it. The reasonableness of this is evident-a patient should not have to undergo lifeprolonging treatment without consideration of the burdens that the treatment would impose. Of course, whether a treatment is warranted depends on its usefulness or benefits as
well.

.. . [So long as mere biological existence is not considered the only value, patients
may want to take the nature of that additional life into account as well.
Id. at 88.
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tion regarding spina bifida.275 Moreover, Professor Robertson contends
that we cannot know whether a severely debilitated infant's life is
worse than death.2 76 He does not mean that we cannot know whether
we suffer in death. Instead, he argues that we cannot know what the

severely retarded and crippled infant experiences. In some sense, the
same problem exists even with competent patients. 27 The law fre-

quently must decipher someone's state of mind and make critical decisions based on that finding.2 78 The Supreme Court has recently imposed stringent limits on the use of presumptions, but the law is settled
that state of mind may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.2 79
Consequently, the fact that many of the people who are responsible for
treating seriously ill newborns, who are aware of an infant's prognosis
and of the facts of institutionalized life, favor nontreatment is highly
relevant to the issue of whether we can infer that a seriously retarded
275. See supra text accompanying notes 210 & 225. See also Robertson, supra note 136, at
77 n.135, discussing the substituted judgment doctrine: "[e]xcept for the situation in which the
newborn is in incessant pain or will survive only a few da)s. it will be hard to conclude that from
its perspective no life is better than this life it now has."
276. Robertson, Legal Aspects of Withholding Medical Treatmentfrom Handicapped Children, supra note 205, at 224. This is not necessarily true:
I offer the following description of a child whose life was apparently "saved" by aggressive
treatment as a foil against arguments in favor of treatment:
I used to annually take a class of senior students in abnormal psychology to visit the
hospital ward in a training school for medical defectives. There was a little boy about 4
years old the first time we visited in the hospital. He was a hydrocephalic with a head so
immensely large that he had never been able to raise it off the pillow and he never would.
He had a tiny little body with his huge head and it was difficult to keep him from developing sores. The students asked, "Why do we keep a child like that alive?"
The next year we went back with another class. This year the child's hands had been
padded to keep him from hitting his head. Again the students asked, "Why do we do
this?" The third year we went back and visited the same child. Now the nurses explained
that he had been hitting his head so hard that in spite of the padding he was injuring it
severely and they had tied his arms down to the sides of his crib.
D. MAGUIRE, supra note 249, at 173 (quoting R. BAKER, DILEIN, AS OF EUTHANASIA at 35 (pamphlet from Fourth Euthanasia Conference, New York, N.Y., Dec. 4, 1971, published by Euthanasia Educational Council, Inc., New York, N.Y.)).
277. See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 21, at 174 ("No one can ever have more than
inferential evidence of consciousness in another person.").
278. The most typical example is a criminal case in which a prosecutor must prove a defendant's state of mind despite the fact that he will not testify on his own behalf and a court or jury
may have to make a life or death decision based on the prosecutor's evidence.
279. See, e.g.. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (holding that conclusive presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts is violative of due process); Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) (holding that permissive presumptions
are to be judged by rational connection between proven fact and fact to be presumed).
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and crippled infant "values" its life.2"'
Advocates of aggressive treatment in spina bifida cases also contend that even if we could identify those infants who will be seriously
retarded and suffer greatly despite treatment, the risks of denying
treatment are too great.28 In effect, their position is that it may well be
moral to deny treatment to one child because its suffering cannot be
alleviated. However, because that might lead to the denial of treatment
of another infant where treatment would be beneficial, society should
require that the hopeless case be treated as well. This is a variation of
the slippery slope argument, which has been effectively rebutted elsewhere.28 2 One additional word about that argument is necessary here.
If one concedes that treatment is not in the best interest of an infant
who will suffer greatly anyway, and I believe that most commentators
would so concede, at least in an extreme case, the only justification for
insisting on treatment is that it may benefit another infant. A sapient
individual is capable of making an autonomous choice to act benevolently, even if the act is against her best interest. In some limited instances, decisions arguably against an incompetent's best interest have
been made for her based on the substituted judgment test.283 But in the
context of seriously ill newborns, it has been argued that the substituted judgment test is inappropriate and that any benefit to third parties is irrelevant in treatment decisions.28 4 Those arguments would militate against requiring treatment if the justification is that benefit will
inure only to another. In effect, the argument would allow one child to
280.

See, e.g., Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child at Risk: On State Supervision of Paren-

tal Autonomy, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD? 153 (W. Gaylin & R. Macklin cds. 1982), cited
in Commission Report, supra note 21, at 228-29 ("As long as the state offers institutions that
provide little more than storage space and 'hay, oats, and water' for medical science's achieve-

ments, the law must err on the side of its strong presumption in favor of parental autonomy and
family integrity."). One response might be that we need to spend more on care for the handicapped. That response may be appropriate, but probably is unrealistic given the current administration's general views on social services. Further, absent infusion of funds, decisionmakers must
consider treatment in light of currently available facilities. As observed by Professor Maguire,
"morality is based on reality," D. MAGUIRE, supra note 249, at 78. The mere possibility of improved conditions does not justify compelling suffering today.

281.

See Robertson, supra note 45, at 255; Smith, supra note 26, at 1164-65.

282.

See, e.g.. Commission Report, supra note 21, at 28-30. "The cost of accepting such an

argument is the continued prohibition of some conduct that is actually acceptable." Id. at 29-30.
See also T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 158, at 115-26; D. MAGUIRE, supra note
249, at 131-40.
283. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
284. Robertson, supra note 45, at 255-61; Robertson, supra note 136, at 76-77.
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be used only as a means to an end, and to do so is immoral. 285
The arguments advanced by advocates of aggressive treatment for
seriously ill newborns can be and have been rebutted. Historical cases
in which treatment has been required over parental refusal to consent
are factually distinguishable from cases like Baby Jane Doe, leaving
courts free to rethink the correct result.286 Appellate courts are only
now confronted with cases like Baby Jane Doe, and their decisions will
be influenced by the growing moral debate on the issue. There is virtually unanimous agreement that treatment ought to be compelled where
the benefits outweigh the burdens of treatment, 287 but there is considerable disagreement on what factors may be placed in that balance. It is
simply irrational to suggest that quality of life is or should be irrelevant
to whether treatment is appropriate. 288 Advocates of aggressive treatment are unwilling to acknowledge that they in fact do consider quality
of life. As demonstrated in Saiketvicz, the degree of retardation or suffering is a fact that must be considered in making a decision that honors a patient as a unique individual. 8 9 Once one concedes that a seriously ill newborn's best interest is not served by treatment, there can be
no justification for continued treatment by reference to the results that
might ensue if treatment is denied.290
SECTION

504

AND THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY

Despite the uncertainty of state law on this question, the government contended that section 504 created federal jurisdiction over treatment cases and established a definitive substantive standard by which
such cases are to be decided.
285. See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 158, at 59, 62. Forcing treatment
on a seriously ill newborn may put us on the reverse side of the slippery slope, e.g., a side that is
disturbingly reminiscent of Nazi experimentation. See supra text accompanying note 282. At

times doctors have justified keeping patients alive because of what they might learn in order to
help other patients. See, e.g., Karnofski, Why Prolong the Life of a Patient with Advanced Can-

cer?, 10 CA at 10 (1960) ("[t]here are a number of practical reasons for treating patients with
advanced cancer. The physicians, both in training or in practice, can learn a great deal from the
study of these patients.
...). See also Stinson & Stinson, On the Death of a Baby. AT.
MONTHLY, July 1979, at 64 (discussing the attitude of the treating ph)sicians). Keeping someone
alive contrary to his best interests may produce useful information for treatment of others, but the
patient has, in effect, become the subject of an experiment if that is the principal justification for
continued existence.
286. See supra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
287.

See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 21, at 88.

288. See supra notes 241-73 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
290.

See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
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President Reagan's original memorandum contended that treatment of seriously ill newborns was guaranteed by equal protection of
the law.29 1 Consistent with the President's understanding of the law,
HHS sent notice to hospitals that it was unlawful to withhold food or
treatment from a handicapped infant if "(1) the withholding is based
on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap does
not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medically contrain29 3
dicated. ' 29 2 As indicated above, HHS's standard is at best confusing.
It attempts to make treatment decisions objective, based on medical
considerations, free from subjective "quality of life" considerations.
Testimony by the Surgeon General and HHS's July 5, 1983, supplementary information reveal, however, that the government does not
consistently adhere to its own rule.294
Additionally, the University Hospital case and HHS's July 5,
1983, supplementary information make it clear that, by the government's view, consideration of spina bifida and attendant retardation
does violate section 504.295 It is important to emphasize that the government believes that treatment is required because of the equal worth
of all human life and that consideration of handicaps, or at least certain handicaps, is a violation of federal law.
The government's position is startling. First, Dr. Koop and other
administration officials were free to choose those handicaps that they
believed fell within the nondiscrimination protection of section 504.20
The officials were not constrained by the language or history of section
504 in developing their list of handicaps. That they felt themselves free
to fashion a medical code unhampered by statutory authority reinforces
the argument that Congress never intended section 504 to encompass
cases like Baby Jane Doe. Second, and more significantly, states have
adopted best interest standards as the principle guiding treatment decisions on behalf of incompetents.2 97 In developing a federal standard,
291. See Reagan, supra note 3.
292. Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment;
Notice of Health Care Providers, supra note 94, reprinted in Commission Report supra note 21,
at 467-68.
293. See Fost, supra note 100.
294. See supra note 98; see also Singer & Kubse, supra note 39, at 18.
295. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care for Handicapped
Infants, supra note 14, at 30,848-52.
296. Compare Surgeon General Koop's testimony before Judge Gesell, reported at Singer &
Kuhse, supra note 39, at 18, with Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to
Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 14, and with Reagan, supra note 3.
297. See supra note 136.
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HHS and President Reagan did not consider the extent to which coercing treatment in a "nondiscriminatory" manner might conflict with
state law.298 As argued above, a plausible case can be made that Baby
Jane Doe's best interest might be violated by compelling treatment. 299
To illustrate the last point, one might consider how a case like
Saikewicz would be decided under the government's substantive standard. The court in Saikewicz applied the substituted judgment test,
consistent with the best interest standard, and concluded that chemotherapy was not required.300 Had Saikewicez's guardian sued in federal
court and stated a private right of action under section 504,301 the
court would have asked whether treatment was medically indicated,
apart from subjective quality-of-life considerations. 0 2 The court would
have had to assure itself that treatment was not being withheld because
of Saikewicz's handicap. What better evidence would have shown that
nontreatment was based on the patient's retardation than the fact that
a majority of competent patients would opt for therapy, given the prospects of prolonged life? Treatment would be required under the government's section 504 approach despite the patient's inability to cooperate
with treatment and the pain and disorientation that it would cause him.
Again, there is not a scintilla of evidence in the congressional history
intended to supplant state law with such a federal
that Congress
30 3
standard.
Ethicists and courts have argued that nontreatment was appropriate in Saikewicz. 30 4 As indicated above, individual characteristics are
relevant to a treatment decision. 30 5 The emerging principle governing
treatment decisions is a balancing test that compares benefits and burdens of treatment. Under this test, the degree of intrusion of therapy
and the patient's ability to experience life are factors highly relevant to
whether treatment is appropriate. 0 6 The government's simplistic defini298. Reagan, supra note 3. See also Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to
Health Carefor HandicappedInfants, supra note 14; supra note 28.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 236-75.
300. 373 Mass. at 744-45, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
302. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants, supra note 14, at 30,846-47.
303. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.D.C. 1983).
304. See, e.g., T. BEAucHAtMP & J. CHILREss, supra note 158, at 132-34; In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
305. See supra notes 261-74 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 21, at 88. On the relevance of the degree of
intrusion of a particular therapy, see, e.g., In re Quinlan. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied,
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tion of discrimination would prevent courts from considering factors
recognized as morally relevant.
The administration's section 504 position is particularly ironic
given the administration's full concurrence in the efforts by right-to-life
groups to remove abortion cases from federal courts. 07 This section of
this article develops some of the arguments used by those who criticize
the federal courts as activist and imperialistic and illustrates that adoption of the government's interpretation of section 504 would violate the
very principles advanced by these critics.
The federal courts have been labelled as activist and imperialistic
for numerous decisions including the abortion cases.30 8 Over the past
several years, groups disgruntled with federal court decisions have
made concerted efforts to curtail federal courts' jurisdiction over particular classes of cases. 30 9 After extensive congressional hearings, 10 these
efforts have proved unsuccessful.311 The arguments in favor of withdrawing particular areas of law from federal jurisdiction demonstrate
the allegedly principled basis for objecting to federal court action.
For example, during 1981 the Senate Subcommittee on Separation
of Powers conducted extensive hearings on S. 158, the Human Life
Bill. 3 12 In substance, the Human Life Bill would have defined the beginning of life as the moment of conception.31 3 Despite some disagree429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978).
307. Cf.Reagan, supra note 3.
308. See supra note 1. The term activist has not always been used consistently; as one scholar
has observed, "commentators have numerous and disparate concepts of activism. . . . Overall, we
receive little more than a babel of loosely connected discussion. . . ...
Canon, supra note 5, at
239.
309. Kay, The Unforeseen Impact on Court and Congress, 65 JUDICATURE 185 (1981).
310. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm,. on
the Judiciary on S. 158, supra note 1. See also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
311. See Tolchin, Amendment Drive on School Prayer Loses Senate Vote, N.Y. Times, Mar.
21, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Around the Nation: Civil Liberties Leader Assails Administration, N.Y.
Times, June 20, 1983, at A10, col. 6.
312. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 158. supra note 1.
313. The first section of the Human Life Bill, S. 158, 97th Cong., IstSess. 160 (1981); H.R.
900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1981), provided:
The Congress finds that present day scientific evidence indicates a significant likelihood
that actual human life exists from conception.
The Congress further finds that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States was intended to protect all human beings.
Upon the basis of these findings, and in the exercise of the powers of the Congress,
including its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, the Congress hereby declares that for the purpose of enforcing the
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ment as to the legal effect of such a rule,3 14 it was fairly obvious that

its proponents hoped that it would have the effect of overruling Roe v.
Wade. 3.5

There is a perceived bias of federal courts in favor of abortion,310
and therefore S. 158 also contained a provision to limit federal court
jurisdiction over abortion cases.317 Senate Bill 158 envisioned that challenges to state statutes regulating abortion would be made in state
courts with ultimate review by the Supreme Court. 31 8 Thus, S. 158
could have had two possible effects. The first would be to overrule the
specific holding of Roe, or, short of that, to invite far greater diversity
of opinion over the legality of abortion legislation. This second effect
would be the result of more courts, i.e., state courts, ruling on the con-

stitutionality of particular statutes subject to limited appeal and certiorari routes to the Supreme Court. Proponents of S. 158 offered interesting justifications for this significant reshaping of federal court
jurisdiction.319
To the supporters of the Human Life Bill, the abortion decisions
obligation of the States under the fourteenth amendment not to deprive persons of life
without due process of law, human life shall be deemed to exist from conception, without
regard to race, sex, age, health, defect, or condition of dependency;, and for this purpose
.person' shall include all human life as defined herein.
314. See Vitiello, Congressional Withdrawal of Jurisdiction From Federal Courts: A Reply
to Professor Uddo, 28 Loy. L. REv. 61, 62 n.11 (1982).
315. For evidence that the bill was intended to overrule Roe, 410 US. 113 (1973). see
Vitiello, supra note 314.
316. See, e.g., Uddo, supra note 1.
317. The Human Life Bill, S. 158, § 2, provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no inferior Federal court ordained and established by Congress under article III of the Constitution of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction, or declaratory judgment in any case involving or arising from any State law or municipal ordinance
that (I) protects the rights of human persons between conception and birth, or (2) prohibits, limits, or regulates (a) the performance of abortions or (b) the provision at public
expense of funds, facilities, personnel, or other assistance for the performance of
abortions.
In the version of the bill reported out by the subcommittee, this became § 4. Sunco.%I.I. o%
SEPARATION OF POWERS, THE HUMAN LIFE

BILL-S. 158, REPORT TOGETER WInt ADDITIONAL
97th Cong.,

AND MINORITY VIEWS TO THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE,

1st Sess. 32 (1981).
318. See Galebach, The Constitutionality of Withdrawal of Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction in the Human Life Bill (written statement to Senate Subcomm. on Separation of Powers). in
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
on S. 158, supra note 1, at 235, 237.
319. See. e.g., id.; Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction:L The Constitutional Basis for
the Proposals in Congress Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190 (1981); Uddo, supra note 1.
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reflect judicial activism in two respects: (1) reproductive privacy rights
are without foundation in the Constitution or statutes; 320 and (2) the
federal courts have intruded on an area traditionally reserved to the
states.3 21 According to a number of commentators, the abortion cases
should be remitted to state courts because those courts reflect the people's will more than do federal courts with life-appointed judges.322
Section 1 of the Human Life Bill was justified because "[o]ne of
the difficulties here arises from the Supreme Court's extravagant interpretation of the 14th amendment (in Roe) . . . the Supreme Court has
reached out to take jurisdiction for itself and responsibilities for itself
that have proven not to be wise. '3 23 The Supreme Court's Roe decision
was seen as an instance of judicial activism because the Court did not
ground its decision on an express provision of the Constitution, but arguably made
up the law without a basis in the Constitution or a
3 24
statute.
The second feature of judicial activism under attack in S. 158 was
that Roe was undemocratic, altering the traditional state-federal balance. Proponents of the bill were consistent in explaining the purpose of
section 2,325 and that the bill was intended to return abortion decisions
to state courts.3 26 This states' rights issue was raised repeatedly during
320.
321.

See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
See Galebach, supra note 318; infra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.

322. See infra notes 330-34 and accompanying text.
323. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate Conn. on the
Judiciaryon S. 158, supra note 1, at 622 (comments of Professor Charles Rice).
More specifically, the bill was described as "a response which is based on the fact that

not only is Roe v. Wade an exercise in bootstrap jurisprudence through the application of
this right of reproductive privacy, which is of the Supreme Court's own invention, but
beyond that, Roe v. Wade is an intrusion on the prerogatives of the State. It is entirely

prudent to correct it in that respect.
Id. at 626 (comments of Professor Charles Rice). The bill also was characterized as follows: "IS.

158] simply provides the underpinning for the States to take such action as they choose to take
based on the establishment of personhood within the status of being preborn. . .
(comments of Representative Henry Hyde).

324.

."

Id. at 920

Id. at 622 (comments of Professor Charles Rice). See also id. at 626 (comments of Pro-

fessor Charles Rice: "Roe v. Wade [was] an exercise in bootstrap jurisprudence through the appli-

cation of this right of reproductive privacy, which is of the Supreme Court's own
invention.
...).
A similar attack on the Court's activism was raised by Justice Rehnquist, a critic of the
undemocratic compositon of federal courts. In his dissent in United Steelworkers v. Weber, he
labelled as Houdini-like efforts by Justice Brennan to justify affirmative action hiring absent support in the relevant statute. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 222 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).

325. See, e.g.,
326.

REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS,

See, e.g., Galebach, supra note 318.

supra note 317, at 29.
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hearings on S. 158. Senator John East, chairman of the Senate subcommittee, criticized Roe for establishing "a universal national standard" without a deliberative process and consensus.3 2
Also included in the hearing record was a written statement by
Stephen H. Galebach.32 8 His theoretical justifications for reallocation
of abortion decisions from federal to state courts summarize the views

of supporters of S. 158. In brief, the proponents' position was that Roe
preempted an important area of state court jurisdiction and that federal courts ought not to be to be interpreting state abortion statutes
because of the traditional view that only state courts can definitively
interpret state law.3 29 The argument also stressed the fact that the Supreme Court fashioned the abstention doctrine, which requires federal
courts to refuse jurisdiction in many cases, to avoid unnecessary federal-state conflict. 330 The policy underlying the abstention cases is particularly appropriate in the abortion context because laws concerning
protection of human life and family law traditionally are left to the
states3

31

327. Senator East testified, in part, as follows:
[T]he bill itself. . . would return the abortion question to the State level and allow for a
great diversity of approach to the issue.
I might relate it to the effort to restore a little more balance in the American
federal system. I have greater confidence in State and local government than you do
[referring to Senator Robert Packwood].
My whole quarrel with Roe v. Wade is we never even had a public debate on this
issue. We were not ever able to do this. The Court precipitated the crisis when they
destroyed all State legislation in this area and threw this thing into the public arena.
The trouble has been that in Roe v. Wade, we had a decision imposed upon us in
which the American people were not a part of the dialog. . . . I might be more inclined
to accept [Roe] if it had been a decision arrived at in the legislative body over a period of
time through public discussion, but the deliberative process of the legislative chamber
was circumvented by Roe v. Wade.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judicia'ry
on S. 158, supra note 1, at 184-85.
328. Galebach, supra note 318, at 235.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 236 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 US. 37 (1971); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
331.
The lower federal courts have no monopoly of the wisdom required to interpret the Constitution. This is particularly so when the controversy concerns criminal laws protecting
human life and family laws concerning the relationship between a woman, her unborn
child, and perhaps the father or guardian of the unborn child. Matters of this kind have
traditionally been resolved by the states, not by the federal government. Reserving such
matters to state courts in the first instance will not jeopardize constitutional rights. ...
The Supreme Court. . . will retain its power of appellate review over questions of consti-
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Other proponents of S. 158 testified as to the educative function

served by democratically chosen state courts and posited the view that
state courts are better situated to decide sensitive right-to-life questions. 332 The effort to remove federal court jurisdiction over abortion
cases has been called a "healthful corrective," allowing state courts to
have their say on life and death issues raised by the abortion question,
and would serve an educative function in that "the Court might learn a
salutary lesson . . . [and] avoid future excursions beyond its proper

bounds." 333
Remitting abortion cases to state courts may mean that various
state courts and legislatures will arrive at disparate results on the same
legal question. The possibility of that
result was readily accepted by
334
advocates of the Human Life Bill.
The government's view of section 504 is curious in light of the
administration's support of the Human Life Bill and its assertions that
the states ought to have jurisdiction over abortion cases. 330 The government's strategy seems to invite the federal courts to act in the very
manner that earned them the enmity of their critics in the abortion
context.
tutional interpretation. Its deliberations may well benefit from the opportunity to consider
the views of state courts on matters traditionally resolved under state law.
Galebach, supra note 318, at 236-37. See also id. at 240-41.
332. The comments of Professor Charles Rice are representative:
I think of course there is a possibility of diverse interpretations, but that is part of
the Federal system, too.
As I was saying before, I think we have suffered greatly in this country in recent
years from the autocratic actions of Federal judges who are uneleeted and appointed for
life. If I were in Congress, I would vote for section 2 on the theory that it is about time
for us to repose responsibility in the State courts and it is about time for us to realize that
there is no inherent superiority of Federal judges over State court judges.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
on S. 158. supra note 1, at 625.
333. Rice, supra note 319, at 197.
334. Senator East commented,
[lit very well may be [the states] could weigh it one way or weigh it the other.
I am not personally troubled with the idea, or deeply anguished over it in terms of
American federalism, that the State might look at this issue and might weigh it, and it
might come down one way or the other, and that would not be inconsistent with what S.
158 purports to do, nor would it be inconsistent with the normal utilization of the due
process clause ...
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
on S. 158. supra note 1, at 791. See also id. at 188-89 (discussion between Representative Dougherty and Senator Baucus); id. at 431 (comments of Professors Uddo and Nagel).
335. Cf. Reagan, supra note 3.
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Apart from constitutional authority or statute, there are prudential
reasons to entrust primary responsibility to the states.33a Baby Jane
Doe involved a matter traditionally resolved by state courts under the
best interest and substituted judgment doctrines, 37 while federal court
decisions on point are infrequent. There is no evidence that state courts
are unable to resolve such life and death questions.338 As medical technology develops, the courts may be presented with more cases in which
treatment may result in a prolonged but seriously impaired existence.
Different states may disagree on what constitutes an infant's best interest in such cases. That states may reach different results on life and
death issues presumably is not, however, a basis for federalizing the
answer to such problems. 3 9
The government's deference to state legal process seems to have
vanished in the Baby Jane Doe case. The New York Court of Appeals
has taken a cautious approach to medical withdrawal decisions.1 0 The
accusation that Baby Jane Doe was neglected was investigated by the
appropriate state agency,341 and the matter was litigated through a
three-tiered court system. 42 Despite these facts, the government attempted to relitigate the case in federal court under its own substantive
standard. Fortunately, the Second Circuit rejected the government's invitation to act in such an imperialistic manner.

3

336. For example, state courts are best suited to interpret state statutes, and entrusting responsibility to the states avoids unnecessary federal-state conflict. Galebach, supra note 318, at
236.
337. See supra notes 173-204 and accompanying text.
338. Proponents of returning abortion cases to the states recognize that states may reach differing results, some perhaps condoning abortion. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon S. 158, supra note 1, at 189.
Thus, if principled, the argument that such life and death questions should be left to the
states cannot turn on the fact that the states' rights proponents disagree with a particular state's
decision in some cases. Further, as discussed supra note 26 and Infra note 393, there is little
evidence that state courts were in fact deciding treatment decisions contrary to the best interest of
seriously ill newborns.
339. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
PENALTY IN
Judiciary on S. 158, supra note 1, at 189. See also H.A. BEDOA, Tie DE.
AMERICA 32-38 (3d ed. 1982) (despite some "federalization" of the death penalty, states still have
latitude in determining life and death issues).
340. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266. cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981).
341. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), afrd. 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
342. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 211, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983).
343. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd. 729 F.2d
144 (2d Cir. 1984).
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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO IMPROPER TREATMENT OF

NEWBORNS

Contemporaneously with the executive branch's efforts to expand
section 504 by regulation and litigation, members of Congress sought
passage of a bill which, in effect, would have enacted the government's
interpretation of section 504.344 House Bill 1904 was recently signed
into law, 345 but not until its most sweeping provisions were amended. 4 0
This section of this article considers the provisions of H.R. 1904 and
suggests a constitutional challenge to efforts to compel unwanted treatment for seriously ill newborns.
As argued above, the government's section 504 stance would have
required treatihent contrary to an infant's best interest in some
cases.3 47 As introduced, H.R. 1904 required states to establish "a procedure for any interested person to report" instances of denial of "medically indicated treatment . . . to infants at risk with life-threatening
impairments."3 48 In effect, H.R. 1904 proposed the same ambiguous
test as did the HHS regulation.
As a result of political compromise, Congress adopted a more explicit standard. 4 9 While retaining the "medically indicated" language,
the act defines that term.35 0 Treatment is required for a seriously ill
newborn if "in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, [it] will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all [life-threatening] conditions. 3 5 1 The act includes important exceptions. Treatment is unnecessary (1) if the infant is persist344. H.R. 1904, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
345. See supra note 19.
346. See infra notes 350-57 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 147-290 and accompanying text.
348. H.R. 1904 amends the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 51015107 (Supp. 1982). As introduced, it would have added the following provision to section

4(b)(2)(B):

.. . including (within one year after the date of the enactment of the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1983) the establishment of a procedure for any interested person to report to appropriate authorities any known or suspected instance of the denial of nutrition
(including fluid maintenance), medically indicated treatment, general care, or appropriate social services to infants at risk with life-threatening congenital impairments.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor,
supra note 19, at 5. For a criticism of treatment that is "medically contraindicated" as unintelligible, see Fost, supra note 100.
349. See Conference Report, supra note 19, at 4.
350. See H.R. 1904, § 121, reprinted in Conference Report, supra note 19, at 4.

351.

Id. § 121(3).
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ently comatose; 52 (2) if treatment "merely prolong[s] dying"; 8 3 (3) if
it cannot ameliorate or correct "all of the infant's life-threatening conditions"; 354 (4) if treatment is futile;355 or (5) if treatment is "virtually
futile" and "the treatment itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane. ' 356 In all cases, even if treatment is otherwise unnecessary,
"appropriate nutrition, hydration [and] medication" must be
35 7
provided.
House Bill 1904 is ambiguous and may require treatment contrary
to the infant's best interest in some cases. There can be little debate
about exempting from treatment infants whose death is imminent or
for whom treatment is futile. In such cases, treatment may increase
suffering without offering any benefit to the infant. 358 Likewise, compulsory treatment for a persistently comatose patient has been consistently rejected. 359 Uncertainty arises when one considers whether such
infants must always be given food, water and medicine. For example,
state courts 360 and moralists36 are divided on whether artificial feeding
must be provided for a persistently vegetative patient. Without a possibility of gaining consciousness, the patient has no measurable interest
in continued existence. While some commentators would require continued artificial feeding, they distinguish food from medical care. 3 2 Indeed, for many, it is morally acceptable to fail to treat with antibiotics
a person suffering from an incurable and painful disease who contracts
an infection. 363 Death may be in the patient's best interest because it
relieves the patient from continued suffering.
Faced with the foregoing examples, medical personnel may be uncertain whether nutrition, hydration and medication are always necessary. Thus the statute provides that "failure to provide treatment
352. Id. § 121(3)(A).
353. Id. § 121(3)(B)(i).
354. Id. § 121(3)(B)(ii).
355. Id. § 121(3)(B)(iii).
356. Id. § 121(3)(C).
357. Id. § 121(3).
358. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 236-37.
359. See e.g., In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. App. 1984); In re P.V.V., 424 So. 2d 1015
(La. 1982); Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982).
360. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); In re
Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303, cert. granted, 470 A.2d 418 (1983).
361. See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 190-91; Annas, Nonfeeding. Lawful Killing In
CA, Homicide in NJ, supra note 158; Lynn & Childress, supra note 158.
362. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 190 NJ. Super 453, 464 A.2d 303, cert. granted, 470 A.2d 418
(1983).
363. See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 84-87.
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(other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication)" is not
neglect if "the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose."" 4 That
medication, food and water must be "appropriate" before being required suggests that they are necessary only if in the best interest of
the infant. 3 '5 But the statute also states that appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication must be given to the comatose infant. That implies that they would always be required for the infant because the
statute distinguishes between unnecessary treatment and necessary nutrition, hydration or medication. Once an infant is irreversibly and
chronically comatose, it would seem that the need for nutrition, hydration and medication is either appropriate or inappropriate in all such
cases. If the statute compels medication, food and water for persistently
vegetative infants, it requires treatment in violation of the infant's best
3 7
interest. As discussed below,3"' that may be unconstitutional.
It was argued above that application of the best interest test to a
case like Baby Jane Doe's makes denial of treatment legally acceptable.368 It is unclear how her case would be decided under H.R. 1904.
Baby Jane Doe's case would be governed by section 121(3)(C), which
allows treatment to be denied or withdrawn if the treatment would be
"virtually futile" and "under such circumstances would be
inhumane."369
There was conflicting testimony concerning Baby Jane Doe's life
expectancy if she were treated. 7 Section 121(3)(C) seems to allow
denial of treatment if medical testimony establishes that an infant's life
expectancy is short. In such a case, treatment would neither "merely
' 'a 1 nor be "futile in terms of the survival of the inprolong
fant. ' 372 dying
But treatment
would be "virtually futile," 373 not because it

364.

H.R. 1904, § 121(3)(A), reprinted in Conference Report, supra note 19, at 4.

365. "Appropriate" is defined as "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, occasion, person,
etc." AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 62 (Random House rev. ed. 1975).
366. See supra notes 347-61 and accompanying text.

367. A similar problem would arise in a case of an infant for whom treatment "merely pro.
long[s] dying." H.R. 1904, § 121(3)(B)(i), reprinted in Conference Report, supra note 19, at 4. If
such an infant contracted an infection, failure to treat that illness with medication might be in its
best interest. The statute would apparently require treatment.
368. See supra text, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, and accompanying notes 147290.
369.
370.

H.R. 1904, § 121(3).
See Hentoff, Big Brotherand the Killing of Imperfect Babies, The Village Voice, Dec, 6,

1984, reprinted in 10 Hum. LIFE REv. 73, 75-78 (1984).
371.

H.R. 1904, § 121(3)(B)(i), reprinted in Conference Report, supra note 19, at 4.

372.

H.R. 1905, § 121(3)(B)(iii).

373.

Id. § 121(3)(C), reprinted in Conference Report supra note 19, at 4-5.
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failed to correct the underlying anomaly, but because it prolonged life
for too short a time. Further, treatment of an infant like Baby Jane
Doe might be withdrawn or denied because it is inhumane to subject an
infant with little chance of a meaningful existence to repeated surgical
procedures.
Both concepts-"virtually futile" and "inhumane" treatment-are
subject to interpretation. Read narrowly, section 121(3)(C) may be invoked to compel treatment for an infant relegated to a marginal existence if medical evidence indicates that life expectancy is for more than
a year or two. As with the government's section 504 stance, H.R. 1904
allows the treatment decision to be made without reference to the state
standard of the child's best interest.
To date, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases in which
denial or refusal of treatment was grounded on the constitutional right
to privacy.0 74 Given the Supreme Court's recent development of that
right375 and the substantial authority for extending it to medical decisionmaking,376 it is probable that the Supreme Court will find that the
right to privacy encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment. If
so, H.R. 1904 is subject to constitutional challenge insofar as it may
require treatment contrary to an infant's best interest.
A child does not necessarily enjoy the same constitutional rights as
an adult. Majority may be a precondition for the exercise of a right, 77
or a minor may have a right subject to different conditions.37 8 State
courts have suggested that the constitutional right to be free from unnecessary treatment extends to seriously ill newborns.37 That view,
however, has analytical difficulties; ordinarily, a person chooses to exercise her constitutional right, but an incompetent cannot do so. As dis374. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
375. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983);
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H.L v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
376. See cases cited supra note 147.
377. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (a child need not be granted
the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings).
378. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (limiting the right of a minor to procure an
abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (recognizing the right of minors
to access to information about contraceptives); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process applies to juvenile proceedings but does not necessarily apply the same standards relevant in adult
proceedings).
379. In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. App. 1984); Custody of a Minor. 385 Mass. 697. 434
N.E.2d 601 (1982).
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cussed above, some incompetents' surrogates may apply the substituted
judgment test, which test has little meaning for a person who has never
formed goals and values. 380 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
has relied on the thinly veiled fiction that the substituted judgment test
applies in such cases; in effect, an infant would choose to have others
act in her best interest.3 81 The law does require a court to act in an
infant's best interest without considering how an infant might choose to
be treated.382
There is a critical distinction between state law requiring the infant to be treated consistently with her best interest and a constitutional right to privacy that encompasses the right to refuse treatment.
Congress might be able to overturn state law, but it cannot impair the
constitutional right.383 If H.R. 1904 were applied to require treatment
contrary to an infant's best interest, a litigant might argue that the
court should accept the substituted judgment fiction to allow the infant
to "choose" to resist treatment. A court might also hold that in the
absence of a capacity to make a meaningful judgment, the infant has a
constitutional right to be treated consistently with her best interest.
That is, instead of denying the infant the constitutional right entirely, a
court may fashion a less flexible standard by which an infant would
retain part of the right.
There is some precedent for such an approach. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that a minor female has a constitutional right
to an abortion, 384 but that the minor's constitutional right is not coterminous with that of an adult.385 The minor's right to an abortion is
subject to reasonable limitations because of "the peculiar vulnerability
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing."388 As a result, a state may require administrative procedures
before a minor can exercise her right, but it cannot deny the right
380. See supra notes 186-204 and accompanying text.
.381.

See Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); Custody of a Minor,

375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v,
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
382. See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 217-23.
383. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-20
(1978).
384. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976).
385. See, e.g.. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).

386. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 634 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). See also City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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entirely. 3 7
The Supreme Court also has required, however, that the state allow a mature minor to exercise her own constitutional right,388 indicating that if the minor failed to establish that she was sufficiently mature
to make the decision for herself, the state must allow the minor to procure an abortion over parental objection if the abortion would be in her
best interest.38 9 Thus, the Court has established that the right to privacy may be exercised consistently with the best interest standard, at
least in the abortion context. If minors incapable of exercising mature
judgment have a constitutional right to be treated in a manner that is
consistent with their best interest, H.R. 1904 would be unconstitutional
insofar as it requires treatment of a seriously ill newborn contrary to
her best interest.
CONCLUSION

The University Hospital litigation is an instance of an exercise of
raw executive powers90 and demonstrates the evanescence of principles
when they conflict with political ends. 391 The government developed its
section 504 strategy in response to President Reagan's personal insistence after he heard about the Indiana Infant Doe case. 38 2 In its subsequent supplementary information, HHS cited only four instances of alleged abuse of newborns suffering from mongolism. 3 3 In at least one of
those cited cases, the child's best interest may have been protected: Infant Doe may have been suffering from additional anomalies that could
have contraindicated surgery. 394 Without hearings on the question, it is
hard to understand how the President and HHS concluded that denial
of treatment was sufficiently widespread to justify federal intervention.
387. 443 U.S. at 649. Accord City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983).
388. 443 U.S. at 649.
389. Id.
390. This is a modification of Justice Whites phrase, "an exercise of raw judicial power." Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissent, which he also applies to Roe).
391. See supra notes 307-43 and accompanying text.
392. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.D.C. 1983).
393. Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped
Infants, supra note 14, at 30,847-48. See also In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796. 156 Cal.
Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Bothman v. Warren B., 445 U.S. 949 (1980). A considerable amount of controversy arose concerning the appeals court decision, and guardianship was
eventually transferred to the couple caring for Phillip, thereby allowing them to consent to surgery. See supra note 54.
394. See supra note 26.
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Apart from the lack of evidence of a need for federal action, the
administration chose a course of action for which there was no statutory authority. It is inconceivable that Congress intended to create federal jurisdiction over treatment decisions for seriously ill newborns
when it enacted section 504. The statutory language has a plain meaning in other contexts, but must be strained to cover cases like Baby
Jane Doe. There is no evidence in the record that Congress intended
federal officials to coerce parents to consent to treatment for a seriously
ill newborn. s 5 Elsewhere Congress has eschewed that kind of intervention.3 96 Apart from whether it has the authority to do so, Congress
would not silently transform cases within the state police power into
federal cases.3 97 The government's section 504 approach, however,
would have precisely that effect. Not only would the government be
empowered to sue in federal court, but also a guardian might be so
empowered because section 504 creates a private right of action.398
Moreover, although HHS's regulations address only newborns, there
would be no reason to limit such actions to this group because there
would be no principled basis for distinguishing treatment decisions involving newborns from those made on behalf of incompetent patients.
Although not without uncertainty, it appears that a plaintiff who
disagreed with a decision not to treat would be well-advised to sue in
federal court rather than in state court. At least at first glance, the
government's section 504 interpretation includes a stringent substantive
test that forbids subjective quality of life considerations because of the
equal value of all lives and that requires the performance of all medically indicated procedures, i.e., those that would be performed on an
infant but for its handicap.39 9 However, the government has shifted its
view of that principle on different occasions. When pressed, Surgeon
General Koop retreated from the apparent meaning of those words;
395. See supra notes 114-45 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976) (dealing with health insurance for the aged and
disabled):

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner

in which medical services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of
any officer or employee of any institution, agency, or person providing health services; or

to exercise any supervision or control over the administration or operation of any such
institution, agency, or person.

397. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
398. See supra text accompanying notes 138-45.
399. Reagan, supra note 3; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health
Carefor Handicapped Infants, supra note 14.
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prolongation of life even for substantial periods of time is not mandated
for infants suffering from some severe handicaps. 400 An even further
retreat was made at oral argument to the district court in University
Hospital when the government conceded that up to that point, despite
substantial discovery, it had found no discrimination against Baby Jane
Doe.10 1 The government's final position, therefore, is unclear. It seems
that some infants suffering from spina bifida may be denied aggressive
treatment, but not others, despite the likelihood that aggressive treatment will substantially prolong the infant's life. It is difficult to imagine
how the government could believe, consistently with the premise of
equal value of all lives, that only some children suffering from a particular disorder deserve full treatment. Furthermore, the government, acting as it did, apparently felt free to pick and choose among various
congenital abnormalities. In effect, it drafted its own medical code because it was unfettered by any limitations posed by the language or
history of the statute. The government's shifting position and arbitrary
standards are further evidence that Congress never intended section
504 to affect treatment decisions for seriously ill newborns.
There is a second sense in which University Hospital was an exercise in raw executive power. Why was Baby Jane Doe made the test
case? The impetus for the government's section 504 position came from
the specter of hospital personnel starving a mongoloid infant to
death.40 2 Baby Jane Doe was far more debilitated than Infant Doe, but
was provided with food and medical treatment. 40 3 Her case had been
extensively litigated through three tiers of the New York court system.
Through discovery and judicial opinions, the government was well
aware of the basis for the parents' refusal to provide aggressive treatment. The government conceded that it found no discrimination up to
October 19, the last date for which it had the medical records.' 4 Nevertheless, it insisted that it needed to continue to monitor the situation.
The government's reasoning would make federal intervention a lifetime
commitment-an awful specter. It is hard to imagine a similar commitment to continuing discovery of medical records for every seriously
400. Singer & Kuhse, supra note 39, at 18-19.
401.

United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1984). aff'g 575 F. Supp.

607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
402. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Carefor Handicapped Infants. supra note 14, at 30,847.
403. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 610 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). afJd. 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).

404.

United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144. 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
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handicapped infant.40 5
Baby Jane Doe simply was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Despite indications in the record that the parents had acted in their
child's best interest and despite the government's conceded doubt that
failure to authorize surgery was discriminatory, Baby Jane Doe was
made a test case for the government's section 504 strategy.
Finally, judged by its own principles, the administration engaged
in an exercise of raw executive power. The administration gave full
endorsement to efforts to pass the Human Life Bill. 40 6 Anti-abortion
advocates have begun to focus attention on decisionmaking for seriously ill newborns and generally see the issues as the same. 40 7 Two
principles emerged in the hearings on S. 158: first, that Roe was an
extravagant interpretation of the law, without foundation in the Constitution or statutes; second, that matters like abortion intimately affect
family matters and the safety, health and welfare of citizens-areas
traditionally left to the states.408 Supporters of S. 158 believed that federalizing the abortion decision deprived the people and the states of the
opportunity to form a consensus on an important life and death
question.
Given those principles and the fact that this administration promised to free individuals from federal intervention, the University Hospital litigation is difficult to explain. The extent to which treatment is
being denied contrary to the best interest of the child is a matter of
speculation, but after its study of the subject, the President's Commission concluded that such instances are rare. 400 More important, HHS
attempted to fabricate a medical code only vaguely related to section
504.410 But for the refusal of the federal courts to create federal jurisdiction, the federal government would have intruded into intimate family law matters on which the people and states have not had the opportunity to form a consensus.
There now is statutory authority for federal involvement in treatment decisions, and H.R. 1904 incorporates HHS's "medically indi405. This administration has shown little interest in other far more serious and widespread
forms of discrimination in health care, for example, the inadequate medical treatment that results
from poverty.
406.

Reagan, supra note 3.

407.

AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,

408.
409.
410.

See supra notes 320-34 and accompanying text.
See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 208.
See supra notes 89-145 and accompanying text.

supra note 26.
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cated" language.41 Passage of H.R. 1904 does not, however, resolve
treatment cases without litigation because the terminology is ambiguous. As indicated above, attempting to make such decisions turn on
"objective" medical factors, as opposed to "subjective" quality of life
considerations, is illusory. 412 Further, there are serious ethical reasons
why quality of life considerations ought to affect a treatment decision.
State courts are virtually unanimous in holding that treatment should
be compelled in life threatening situations, but only if it promises net
benefits to the infant. 413 Although this point is debatable, quality of life
should be considered in that balance. Courts, commentators, patients
and health care professionals rightly consider quality of life, whether or
not they acknowledge it as such. If a patient lacks cognition, corrective
procedures offer no benefit. 41 4 Depending on how courts interpret
"medically indicated," H.R. 1904 may compel treatment contrary to
an infant's best interest. If so interpreted, H.R. 1904 may be subject to
a constitutional challenge.41 5
In University Hospital the government abandoned its principles,
supposedly in the name of higher principles: "My administration is
dedicated to the preservation of America as a free land, and there is no
cause more important for preserving that freedom than affirming the
transcendent right to life of all human beings, the right without which
no other rights have any meaning. 416 Apart from the fact that even
this administration does not take that statement quite literally, invocation of such a high-sounding goal obscures the facts in University Hospital. The government brought to bear all of its political and financial
muscle to influence a treatment decision in a case where it concededly
doubted that aggressive treatment was appropriate. Baby Jane Doe
could not benefit by the government's intervention, but other parents
and hospitals cannot miss the lesson of her case: the parental constitutional right to determine appropriate treatment and an infant's right to
be free from procedures of questionable value can quickly become exorbitantly expensive.41 7 If we are to enact legislation allowing the govern411.
412.

H.R. 1904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
See supra notes 236-60 and accompanying text. See also Fost, supra note 100.

413. See supra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 261-75.

415. See supra text accompanying notes 344-89.
416.

Reagan, supra note 3, at 16.

417. According to the father of Baby Jane Doe, the family had already spent over S100,000
on legal and medical fees, and they anticipated spending at least that amount again before the
matter was finally resolved. CBS television interview, 60 Minutes: Baby Jane Doe's Parents(Mar.
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ment to intervene in treatment decisions, its power should be directed
toward more productive results. As observed in a related context, "for
the [government] to do other than either assume full responsibility for
the treatment, care, and nurture of [seriously handicapped] children or
honor the parent's decision to consent to or refuse authorization for
treatment would be but to pay cruel and oppressive
lip service to no418
tions of human dignity and the right to life."

11, 1984).
418. Goldstein, supra note 280, at 153.

